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Significantly, however, there are burgeoning numbers of cases where
employer status is found in the absence of a direct relationship to a
statutory employer. This Article refers to these entities as quasi-employers
because they are not employers in the traditional sense, yet they are subject
to the dictates of employment law legislation.
This Article reviews the following theories of quasi-employer
responsibility: the Sibley Interference Theory, the Spirt Delegation
Theory, the Joint Employer Theory, and the Single Employer Theory. This
Article also reviews the issue of individual supervisory liability as
employers under the major employment statutes. Individuals are not
normally thought of as employers, but they sometimes have a great deal of
influence over the terms and conditions of employees’ employment.
Therefore, this Article considers them to be a type of quasi-employer.
In order to analyze the definitional status of employers and quasiemployers, it is necessary to examine the definitional status of employees.
Significantly, however, the law is in a complete state of disarray with
regard to the definition of employee. Therefore, it should come as no
surprise that the definition of employer is also often unclear. Nevertheless,
there is a significant body of law that supports treating quasi-employers as
employers. Unfortunately, there has not been much scholarship focusing
on employer status and virtually no academic commentary discussing the
status of quasi-employers.
As with employee status, it is important for there to be a clear
definition of who is an employer so that both employees and employers
know what their rights and responsibilities are. The consequences of not
knowing who ones’ employer is can be fatal to any litigation. It is also
important to outline clear criteria because future generations will be
looking to established case law to determine employer status in work
environments that may look very different from work environments of
today.
It is hoped that this Article contributes to bringing about certainty to,
in Justice Rutledge’s words, “the borderland” between what is an
employer-employee relationship and what is not.
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INTRODUCTION

The world of work has long been important to individuals as well as to
society. Not only does it enable us to provide for our families, but it often
defines who we are.2 Many individuals spend more time at work than with
their families. Indeed, Sir William Blackstone referred to work as one of
the three great relations in private life.3
As this author and others have recognized, remarkably, there is no
clear understanding about how the law should distinguish between
employees and non-employees whether they are characterized as
volunteers, independent contractors, or shareholders.4 This lack of clarity
is largely due to the fact that the statutory language defining employee
status in virtually all of our nation’s employment laws is vague, conclusory,
and largely useless.5
This Article hopes to bring attention to a related issue, namely, how
courts should distinguish between who is and who is not an “employer”
under this country’s labor and employment laws. Particular attention is
paid to employers who are, in Justice Rutledge’s words, on the

2. See Vivian Berger, Respect in Mediation: A Counter to Disrespect in the
Workplace, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 18, 18 (2009) (stating that much of our sense of identity,
worth, and self-respect stems from how well we are doing at work).
3. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422 (“The three great relations in
private life are, 1. That of master and servant; which is founded in convenience, whereby a
man is directed to call in the assistance of others, where his own skill and labour will not be
sufficient to answer the care incumbent upon him. 2. That of husband and wife. . . . [and] 3.
That of parent and child . . . .”). In England, the master-servant relationship was the preindustrial age analogue to the employer-employee relationship. Jeffrey E. Dilger,
Comment, Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain: Control as a Nonfactor in
Employee Status Determinations Under FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB.
& EMP. LAW 123, 125 (2010) (discussing origins of the distinction between employee and
independent contractor).
4. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected
Volunteers, 9 U. OF PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 158–60 (2006) (discussing the employment
status of volunteers); see also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an
Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 295, 296 (2001) (describing statutory definitions of employee status as “baffling”);
Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 75, 76–77 (1984) (criticizing the common law test of employee status);
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 353 (2011)
(explaining that the struggle to distinguish between employees and independent contractors
has been lengthy and confusing).
5. The Supreme Court, for example, has referred to the definition of an employee
under the Americans with Disabilities Act as a “mere ‘nominal definition,’” Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003), and has stated that the
definition of an employee under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act is
“completely circular and explains nothing,” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 323 (1992).
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“borderland” between being an employer and a non-employer.6 This
Article examines a category of these putative employers referred to as
quasi-employers. However, in order to examine these non-traditional
employers, the definition of employer with respect to traditional employers
must first be examined. This Article demonstrates that, like courts trying to
distinguish between employees and non-employees, the definition of
“employer” is often vague and inconsistent.
This is not helpful for anyone. Both employees and employers need to
be able to determine what rights they do or do not have. When
employment status is unclear, employment rights are unclear. Uncertainty
can become a breeding ground for litigation.
Unlike other areas of law, employers and employees cannot simply
legislate their status by entering into a contractual agreement declaring that
the individual in question is or is not an employee of a particular
employer.7
There are, of course, public policy implications by
characterizing an individual as an employee, which include protection
under various state and federal employment laws as well as a requirement
that withholding taxes must be paid.8 Indeed, it has been estimated that
classifying individuals as independent contractors instead of as employees
might result in a savings of twenty to forty percent of labor costs.9
In any event, at some level one can understand the struggle modernday courts are having with employees and employers at the margins. Most
6. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944).
7. See, e.g., Narayan v EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
a contractual agreement which purports to declare that an individual is an independent
contractor and not an employee is not dispositive); accord, Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins.
Co. of Neb., 207 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2000); Feldmann v. New York Life Ins. Co., No.
4:09-CV-2129-MLM, 2011 WL 672647 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 17, 2011); In re O’Connor, 67
A.D.3d 1302, 1303, 890 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664 (2009) (holding the same under New York
Unemployment Insurance Law); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 256
Cal. Rptr. 543, 547 (Cal. 1989) (“The label placed by the parties on their relationship is not
dispositive, and subterfuges are not countenanced.”).
The fact that a contract designates that an individual is an independent contractor
may however, be entitled to some weight in making the determination whether the
individual in question is in fact an employee. See generally Nat’l Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB,
273 F.2d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 1960) (explaining that the contractual designation of an
individual as an independent contractor is indicative of the intentions of the parties); NLRB
v. A. S. Abell Co., 327 F.2d 1, 6–7 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding that an agreement stating that an
individual is not an employee is of some importance, but not controlling); accord, Brown v.
J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F. 3d 175 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that an independent contractor agreement,
while not dispositive, is strong evidence of independent contractor status). But see Fortune
v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Ga. App. 1995) (stating under Georgia
law independent contractor agreements are presumed to be valid).
8. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that
employee status is of crucial significance in determining applicability of Title VII).
9. Jenna Amato Moran, Note, Independent Contractor or Employee? Misclassification
of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 121 (2010).
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of our labor and employment laws were drafted with the notion of full time
traditional employment in mind, which is often no longer the case.10 More
fundamentally, the definition of “employee” that employer status is heavily
dependent upon, developed from common law tort principles involving
vicarious liability of employers—not employment law dogma.11
This confusion, however, may also be due to the fact that courts have
not paid enough attention to analyzing the case law. In defining employer
status, many courts simply focus on the definition of employee and only
pay lip service to the definition of employer.12 Thus, it should come as no
surprise that litigation has ensued with respect to employers who are in the
borderland.13 What is surprising is that there is a paucity of academic
scholarship focusing on employer status.
On the other hand, perhaps the confusion is simply an inherent part of
our common law system. The Supreme Court recognized more than seven
decades ago that social legislation, such as the National Labor Relations
Act,14 is not subject to a mathematical formula and “seldom attains more
than approximate precision of definition.”15 Most, if not all, employment
laws are a product of social legislation.
Whatever the cause, in defining employee and employer status, most
cases are obvious and courts have little difficulty in distinguishing between
employees and non-employees and therefore, between employers and nonemployers.16 However, the employer status of what I call quasi-employers
is not obvious and is the product of much litigation.

10. Deanne M. Mosley & William C. Walter, The Significance of the Classification of
Employment Relationships in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 MISS. L.J. 613, 613
(1998) (“The ever increasing intervention of the federal government into the labor arena has
provided incentives for employers to restructure their work forces so that they employ fewer
full-time employees and more part-time or temporary employees and/or independent
contractors.”).
11. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. at 120 n.19 (explaining that the common law
definition of employee evolved from tort principles involving vicarious liability); see also
Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective
Bargaining, 39 B.C.L. REV. 329, 334 (1998) (reviewing the development of the common
law definition of an employee).
12. See infra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.
13. The definitions of employee and employer are not only of significance to labor and
employment law. They are also critical in determining tort liability, as well as tax liability.
Mosley, supra note 10, at 628; see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. U.S.,
131 S.Ct. 704, 714–16 (2011) (upholding tax regulations that provide that individuals
scheduled to normally work forty or more hours per week are not exempt as students who
perform work as an incident to pursuing a course of study); Schramm v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, T.C. Memo., No. 8938-09 (T.C. Aug. 30, 2011) (holding that an adjunct professor
who taught an online class was not an independent contractor for tax purposes).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
15. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941).
16. JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2260 (5th ed. 2006).
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Quasi-employers are not employers in the traditional sense; however,
the law considers them to be employers because they may significantly
interfere with an employment relationship, may have been delegated a
significant amount of responsibility with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, may be joint or single employers, or otherwise have effective
control over employees.
In defining employment relationships, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that it is appropriate for a court construing one employment
statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), to look to other
employment law statutes, such as the NLRA, for guidance.17 This Article
follows that same path by discussing employment laws in general and not
focusing in on any particular employment law statute.18
Before employer status can be examined, it is first necessary to
understand employee status. Therefore, Part II of this Article examines the
17. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947)
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . is a part of the social legislation of
the 1930’s of the same general character as the National Labor Relations Act . .
. and the Social Security Act . . . . Decisions that define the coverage of the
employer-employee relationship under the Labor and Social Security acts are
persuasive in the consideration of a similar coverage under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
Because most employment statutes define employee and employer status with virtually
identical language, several courts have indicated that it is appropriate to look to various
employment law cases under other employment law statutes for guidance. See e.g.,
Dellinger v. Science Applications, Int’l Corp., 649 F.3d 226, 231(4th Cir. 2011) (King, J.,
dissenting) (stating that it is appropriate to interpret FLSA in the same manner as Supreme
Court did under Title VII); Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., No. 06-CV-1495,
2009 WL 3602008 at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 2780927, No. 09-4498
(3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the court interprets the term “employee” in the same manner
under Title VII, FLSA and state human rights law).
However, it is not always appropriate to assume that all employment statutes will be
interpreted in exactly the same manner. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv. Inc., 129 S.Ct.
2343, 2348–49 (2009) (explaining that Title VII has a materially different burden of
persuasion than the ADEA); Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 227 (holding that FLSA anti-retaliation
provision does not apply to job applicants and court refused to follow case law holding to
the contrary under Title VII, the NLRA, and OSHA).
18. It should be noted that neither employee nor employer status is required for
coverage under certain anti-discrimination statutes, see, e.g., Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an anti-discrimination
statute, in a non-employment case), or for coverage under the First Amendment, see, e.g.,
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996) (holding that independent
contractors are protected from retaliation under the First Amendment).
Additionally, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1)
(2006), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to enjoin the sale of so called “hot goods” which
were produced in violation of that statute without considering whether or not the individuals
are employees. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking The Employer Out of Employment Law?
Accountability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 219–24 (2011) (discussing the FLSA hot goods provision).
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differing definitions of “employee” that have been utilized by courts in
labor and employment cases. In this section, the Common Law Test, the
Common Law Entrepreneurial Test, Statutory or Primary Purpose Test,
Economic Realities Test and the Hybrid Test are each separately examined.
In Part III, this Article then turns to a discussion of employer status that is
heavily dependent on cases concerning employee status. Part IV then
discusses “quasi-employers.” Quasi-employers are liable as employers
under employment law, but their status is not obvious because they do not
easily fit into the definition of an employer. A quasi-employer relationship
can be found under a variety of legal theories which this Article then
discusses in seriatim: Sibley Interference Theory, Spirt Delegation Theory,
Contractor Employees and Third-Party Employers, Joint Employer Theory,
and Single Employer Theory. Additionally, under certain employment
statutes, individual supervisors can be held personally liable because they
are considered to be a type of quasi-employer and this issue is discussed at
the end of Part IV. Part V concludes by explaining that holding quasiemployers responsible for compliance with this nation’s labor and
employment laws is analogous to other principles of labor and employment
and, therefore, legally appropriate.
This Article then summarizes
applicable law and makes a call for uniformity with respect to this
important area of law.
II.

WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE?

In order to understand the legal issues surrounding employee status, it
is necessary to first examine and define the term “employee.”
Unfortunately, that has proven difficult to do as there is not a single
accepted test for employee status.19 This is largely because the terms
“employee”20 and “employer”21 are not well-defined in most of our nation’s
19. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating
that the determination of employee status is not subject to a bright line test and is “a longrecognized rub”); Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2006)
(indicating that the threshold question of who is an employee is “a recurring question”);
Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case For
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws To Include Independent Contractors,
38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 243 (1997) (noting that the distinction between independent
contractors and employees remains unsettled).
20. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), states that the term “employee” shall
be defined as “includ[ing] any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006), and The Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 29
U.S.C. § 1211(4), define an employee as “an individual employed by an employer . . . .”
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 630(f), and
the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) define
an employee as “any individual employed by an employer . . .” FLSA defines an
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employment laws, and as a result a significant amount of litigation has been
generated which attempts to clarify what these terms mean.22 The lack of
statutory and judicial clarity has no doubt contributed to the problem of
misclassification.
The problem of employee misclassification is particularly acute.
While it is difficult to quantify just how widespread this problem is, a
scholarly study looking at New York State estimated that 10.3% of privatesector workers were misclassified each year.23 In Maine, another scholarly
study found that 14% of construction employers misclassify workers as
independent contractors and 11% of Maine employers under report wages
and unemployment compensation tax liability.24 A U.S. Department of
Labor study indicated that between 10% and 30% of audited employers
misclassify their employees.25 Indeed, as this Article goes to print, the
“employee” as “any individual employed by an employer” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), but it also
defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit work.” Id. at § 203(g). The Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), expressly incorporates the FLSA definition of employee. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611 (3).
21. The NLRA defines an employer simply as “any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2003(b),
and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an
industry effecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a
person . . . .” The ADEA defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). ERISA defines
an employer as “any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an
employer . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). The FLSA defines employer as “any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. §
202(d). The FMLA defines employer as “any person engage in commerce or in any
industry or activity affecting commerce who employs fifty or employees . . . .” 29 U.S.C. §
2611(4).
22. It should be noted that to be covered under federal employment laws, an employer
must also be engaged in a certain volume of “interstate commerce.” Katherine V. W. Stone,
Legal Protections For Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without
Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 259
(2006); see, e.g., Vega v. Peninsula Household Services, Inc., No. C-08-03815 JCS, 2009
WL 656291, at *4 (N.D. Ca 2009) (FLSA case).
23. LINDA H. DONAHUE, JAMES R. LAMARE & FRED B. KOTLER, THE COST OF WORKER
MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2007). See also M. PATRICIA SMITH, JENNIFER S.
BRAND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE
MISCLASSIFICATION (2009) (discussing problem of worker misclassification under New
York law).
24. ELAINE BERNARD & ROBERT HERRICK, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN MAINE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 1–2 (2005).
25. In August 2009, the federal government released a report highlighting the extent of
the problem of worker misclassification.
The IRS last did a study of worker
misclassification in 1984 and concluded that about fifteen percent of the workforce was
misclassified. Additionally, a 2000 U.S. Department of Labor study concluded that between
ten and thirty percent of the firms audited had misclassified employees as independent
contractors. The IRS is expected to issue an updated report on the extent of employee
misclassification in 2013. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE
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Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as well as the U.S. Department of Labor
are increasingly auditing employers with respect to the issue of worker
classification.26
Both the U.S. Department of Labor and several state legislatures have
begun to pay greater attention to the problem of employee
misclassification.27 Indeed, in 2009 President Obama created a Middle
Class Task Force headed by Vice President Biden to detect and remedy the
problem of worker misclassification.28 As part of that initiative, on
September 19, 2011, the IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor as well as
seven states entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to share
information and other materials and to coordinate law enforcement
activities designed to reduce worker misclassification.29
MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER
ENSURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION 10–14 (2009) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE
MISCLASSIFICATION].
26. See Susan A. Berson, IRS Gets Class Conscious: Switching To Independent
Contractors Draws Scrutiny, 97 A.B.A. J. 27 (2011) (stating that during 2011–2014, the IRS
plans to increase random audits of employers and that the Department of Labor has
increased its auditing activity as well).
27. See, e.g., Bran Noonan, The Campaign Against Employee Misclassification, 82
N.Y.S. Bar. J. 42, 47 (2010) (noting that because of the problem of worker misclassification,
legislation has been proposed in New York which would utilize a single unified test of
employee status). Indeed, during a 2011 New York State Bar Association Conference
sponsored by the Section of Labor and Employment Law, the problem of worker
misclassification was described as the issue of the year. Sharon P. Stiller, Worker
Misclassification Issues In New York, at 1 (N.Y.S. Bar Assoc. Labor and Employment Law
Section Annual Meeting Jan. 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
In October of 2011, California passed legislation that subjects employers to civil penalty and
government contractors to debarment if they willfully misclassify individuals as
independent contractors. Chapter 706, to be codified at CALIF. LAB. CODE § 226.8
(approved Oct. 9, 2011). California also made a person who knowingly advises an
employer to treat an individual as an independent contractor, to avoid a finding of employee
status, jointly and severally liable with the employer. Id. at § 2753(a).
28. Press Release, White House Announces Middle Class Task Force (Jan. 30, 2009).
29. See WHD News Release 11-1373-NAT, Labor Secretary, IRS Commissioner Sign
Memorandum of Understanding to Improve Agencies’ Coordination on Employee
Misclassification Compliance and Education (Sept. 19, 2011). Deputy Secretary of Labor
Seth Harris explained the significance of the problem of worker misclassification in his
testimony before Congress:
“Misclassification” seems to suggest a technical violation or a paperwork error.
But “worker misclassification” actually describes workers being illegally
deprived of labor and employment law protections, as well as public benefits
programs like unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation because
such programs generally apply only to “employees” rather than workers in
general. . . . Misclassification is no mere technical violation. It is a serious
threat to workers and the fair application of the laws Congress has enacted to
assure workers have good, safe jobs.
Leveling the Playing Field: Protecting Workers and Businesses Affected by
Misclassification Before the S. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 111th
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It is somewhat surprising that before these recent developments, the
problem of employee and employer misclassification has not received more
legislative and political attention. Indeed, the distinction between
employee and independent contractor, which generates the most litigation,
is by no means a new phenomenon and actually dates back to Roman law.30
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized almost seven decades ago
that “[f]ew problems in the law have given greater variety of application
and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what
is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of
independent, entrepreneurial dealing.”31 While that particular court case
dealt with the status of independent contractors,32 the situation is no less
confusing when courts try to define the line between employers and nonemployers or between employees and non-employees, such as volunteers33
and retirees.34
On some level the ambiguity and confusion over employee status is
understandable, at least with respect to some employers. There is, of
course, a great variety of workplaces. Employers as a group are in business
to earn a profit. As such, many want to maintain a maximum amount of
discretion over the terms and conditions of employment of their workers.
Therefore, some employers may desire to maintain control, which is a
major factor in any analysis of employee status. Others may, of course, be
engaging in purposeful manipulation in order to avoid a finding of
employee status at all costs.35
Maximization of the right of control makes it more likely that the
workers in question are employees. Most employees are entitled to
protection under employment and labor law statutes, including the NLRA,
and its prospect for unionization.36 Thus, some employers may purposely

Cong. (2010) (statement of Seth Harris, Deputy Sec’y of Labor).
30. KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT, ROBERT N. COVINGTON & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LEGAL
PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 41 (4th ed. 2010).
31. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (footnote omitted).
32. Since its enactment in 1935, the NLRA has lacked clarity with respect to employee
classification. Micah Prieb Stoltzfus Jost, Note, Independent Contractors, Employees And
Entrepreneurialism Under The National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-By-Worker
Approach, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311, 317 (2011).
33. I have previously explained that it is important to distinguish between volunteers
and employees because most of our nation’s employment laws only apply to employees.
Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 150.
34. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971) (holding retired persons are not employees under the NLRA).
35. On Oct. 11, 2011, California made it unlawful for a person to knowingly advise an
employer to misclassify an individual as an independent contractor. Interestingly, attorneys
are exempt from the reach of this statute. See Chapter 706, codified at CAL. LAB. CODE. §
2753 (approved Oct. 9, 2011).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 151–52.
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seek to place their workers in a zone of ambiguity in order to give them the
ability to argue against employee status while maintaining a modem of
control.37
Despite the ambiguity that is often in play in these types of cases,
courts must often draw lines because they simply do not have jurisdiction if
the individual in question is not an employee.38 Without the counting of the
putative employee, the corporation at issue might not meet the statute’s
numerosity requirement necessary to being considered an employer.39 The
consequences of finding that an individual is not an employee are also
significant to the individual as they may not be eligible for a public
pension,40 collective bargaining,41 or protection by employment laws.42
In most instances, mere misclassification of an employee is not
unlawful.43 California, however, recently enacted a statute which makes it
unlawful to willfully misclassify an individual as an independent
contractor.44 Otherwise, worker misclassification merely leads to a finding

37. Jost, supra note 32, at 315 (stating that given the lack of clarity in the law, some
employers may manipulate work relationships or deliberately and illegally misclassify
workers).
38. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that
the line between who is an employee and who is an independent contractor under the NLRA
is jurisdictional because the NLRB does not have jurisdiction over independent contractors);
Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., No. 07-0859, 2008 WL 2129887, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2008),
aff’d. in part and rev’d. in part, 581 F.3d 175 (3d. Cir. 2009) (same under Title VII).
39. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing numerosity in employment
law).
40. See, e.g., Scheurer v. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., 636 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996) (finding that a hearing examiner is not an employee of the City and therefore, not
entitled to retirement system membership).
41. See, e.g., Levitt v. Bd. of Certification of the Office of Collective Bargaining, 710
N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding that hearing officers who are not employees
are not eligible for collective bargaining under Civil Service Law); Brown Univ., 342
N.L.R.B. 483 (2004) (finding that graduate students are not employees under the National
Labor Relations Act and therefore, NLRB dismisses union election petition). The NLRB
has indicated that it is going to review Brown. N.Y. Univ., 356 NLRB No. 7, slip op. at 2
(Oct. 25, 2010).
42. Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 509 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and
does not cover claims brought by independent contractors); Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf,
388 F.3d 522, 529 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that unpaid police officers are not subject to
FLSA as they are not employees and dismissing the FLSA claim); Tadros v. Coleman, 717
F. Supp. 996, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a
volunteer doctor is not an employee in dismissing the Title VII employment discrimination
claim). Accord, Richard Bales & Lindsay Mongenas, Defining Independent Contractor
Protection Under the Rehabilitation Act, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 435 (2011) (discussing
whether independent contractors are protected from discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act).
43. EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 25, at 7.
44. Act of Oct. 9, 2011, 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 706, (to be codified at CAL. LAB. CODE. §
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that a particular employment law was violated. For example, if the
employer does not comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act, it will
be found to have violated that statute by not applying it to the employee in
question.45
Remarkably, some courts have assumed that the definition of an
employee is uniform across federal law.46 That is simply wrong. At least
four well-established definitions exist: the common law agency test, the
primary or statutory purpose test, the economy reality test, and a hybrid
combination of the common law and economic reality tests. A fifth may be
emerging, which this Article defines as the “common law entrepreneurial
test.”47 This Article now turns to a discussion of those tests.
A.

Common Law Agency Test

The starting point for most employee status analysis cases48 is the
“common law right to control” test, which may be considered simplistic,
but in reality is quite difficult to apply.49 Under the common law, labels
placed on employees, are not controlling and the entire circumstances must
be examined.50 One Title VII case illustrative of this standard is Salamon
v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp.51 In Salamon, the Second Circuit held that
the common law agency test should be the default standard. The court
reached this result by looking to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden,52 in which the Court
226.8). Employers who violate this statute could be subject to a civil penalty and in
addition, governmental contractors could be subject to disbarment.
45. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006) (prohibiting
interference with rights provided under the Act).
46. See, e.g., Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (illustrating
the understanding of some courts that the definition of employee is uniform federally).
47. See supra notes 66–85 and accompanying text; Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 161.
Some courts have also noted that there is little difference between the common law test and
the hybrid test. Id. at 168–69; see also Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2009)
(indicating that hybrid test is not materially different from common law test).
48. See Langfitt v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 647 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 2011)
(stating that “[o]ne of the foremost status distinctions at common law is that between an
employee and an independent contractor.”).
49. Mosley, supra note 10, at 632 (stating that the common law test is “rather
simplistic”).
50. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (“Where the
work done, in its essence, follows the usual path of an employee, putting on an ‘independent
contractor’ label does not take the worker from the protection of the Act.”); see also FedEx
Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that there is no magic
phrase to be applied and all incidents of the relationship must be examined under the
common law standard).
51. Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., No. 06-1707-cv, 2008 WL 2609712, at
*1061 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2008).
52. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
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held that the common law standard was the appropriate one to use where a
statute fails to specifically define “employee.”53
The circuit court summarized the common law right to control test by
quoting the factors examined in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid.54 Those factors are as follows:
1 the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished; . . . 2 the skill required; 3 the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; 4 the location of the
work; 5 the duration of the relationship between the parties; 6
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
to the hired party; 7 the extent of the hired party’s discretion over
when and how long to work; 8 the method of payment; 9 the
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 10 whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; 11
whether the hiring party is in business; 12 the provision of
employee benefits; 13 and the tax treatment of the hired party.55
These Reid factors are non-exhaustive and other factors may be
considered. While these factors are not to be applied in a “mechanistic
fashion,” special weight is given to the control of the manner and means by
which assigned tasks are completed.56
In a footnote, Salamon added that, prior to even analyzing the Reid
factors, a plaintiff must have received some form of remuneration to
establish that he or she was hired.57 I have addressed the remuneration
issue elsewhere and referred to the test of employee status as involving a
two-step inquiry: whether a hiring took place (which generally requires
remuneration) and whether the common law agency standards as reflected
in Reid are satisfied.58 The law is still developing with respect to whether
or not the first factor, which requires a hiring, is a necessary part of the test
for employee status.59
Outside cases involving volunteers, there is usually no issue with
respect to whether a hiring took place or whether remuneration is received.
53. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1060.
54. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
55. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1061 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52); see also
Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–24 (adopting Reid factors to determine whether individual was
employee under ERISA).
56. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1061 (citing numerous authorities). But see
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (putting special weight
on the possibility of entrepreneurial opportunity).
57. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1061 n.10.
58. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 175–79.
59. Compare O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997) (adopting twofactor test) with Bryson Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F. 3d 348, 352–56 (6th
Cir. 2011) (rejecting two-factor test). See also Junino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5,
No. 11-466, 2012 WL 527972 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2012) (discussing conflicting case law).
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Therefore, whether or not this two-factor test applies is immaterial to the
vast majority of U.S. employers.
In addition to most Title VII cases60 and ERISA cases,61 the common
law test is utilized in NLRB cases,62 cases under the Uniform Services
Employment and Reemployment Act,63 and other employment law statutes,
including many state employment laws.64
1.

Common Law Entrepreneurial Control Test

There is some support for the possible development of another test of
employee status (or at least another aspect of the common law right to
control test) that can be called the “common law entrepreneurial control
test.”65
The Restatement (Third) of Employment Law66 links the definition of
independent business, which is crucial in analyzing whether or not an

60. In Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997), the Supreme Court
arguably approved of the common law test in Title VII cases.
61. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
62. The Arizona Republic, 349 N.L.R.B. 1040 (2007) (noting that news carriers are
independent contractors). An interesting twist to this case is that it generated a strong
dissent from former NLRB Member Wilma Liebman, in which she factored into the
equation the economic dependence of the putative employee. It appears that Liebman
would adopt a type of hybrid test for employee status, as utilized in many cases under Title
VII, where the common law test is combined with the economic reality test (in which the
focus is on economic dependence).
Query as to whether Liebman’s dissent is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
adoption of the common law test of employee status in NLRB cases. See NLRB v. United
Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (reviewing definition of employee under
NLRA); Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee: Putting the Autonomous Dignified
Union Worker Back to Work, 5 F.I.U. L. REV. 495 (2010) (examining the definition of
employee). In any event, the NLRB continues to apply the common law test. Lancaster
Symphony Orchestra, 357 NLRB No. 152 (Dec. 27, 2011).
63. Evans v. Massmutual Fin. Grp., No. 09-CV-6028 CJS, 2009 WL 3614534
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2009) (applying common law test of employee status under this statute).
64. See, e.g., In re Concourse Ophthalmology Assocs., P.C., 456 N.E.2d 1201, 1201
(N.Y. 1983); Matter of Viig v. Comm’r of Labor, 886 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
65. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW 18–19 (3d ed. 2008) (raising the question of whether entrepreneurial
control test differs from common law agency test); see also Dilger, supra note 3, at 124
(stating that common law right to control test has been replaced with test of entrepreneurial
opportunity).
66. On May 19, 2009, the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law was adopted by the
American Law Institute, subject to additional discussion and editorial prerogative. 86th
Annual Meeting, ALI.ORG, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=meetings.annual_
updates_09 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011). It is important to note, however, the Restatement of Law
Third Employment Law has not been adopted by any jurisdiction.
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individual is an employee, to entrepreneurial control.67 The Comment to
the Restatement explains that the right to control inquiry is only part of the
common law analysis, in that “the more fundamental question of whether
the service provider has entrepreneurial discretion to operate an
independent business.”68
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB69 is the leading case involving
entrepreneurial opportunity as a factor in determining employee status. In
FedEx, the D.C. Circuit faced the issue of whether drivers are independent
contractors. The court held that in determining whether the individuals in
question were independent contractors under the NLRA common law right
to control test, courts should examine whether “the position presents the
opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism.”70 The majority did
not view this as a new test for employee status, but instead relied on an
earlier decision which indicated that the court and NLRB shifted emphasis
away from the right to control inquiry toward “a more accurate proxy.”71
That proxy is whether the individuals in question have a significant
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.72 In finding the drivers to be
independent contractors, the majority indicated that it considered all the
common law factors and balanced them.73 Thus, the majority was
attempting to apply the common law right to control test, at least on paper.
By contrast, the dissent stated that the majority’s shift in emphasis to
entrepreneurial opportunity amounted to a new test for employee status.
The dissent indicated that the majority’s determination was contrary to
existing law. It criticized the majority’s adoption of a new standard based
on a single instance of entrepreneurial opportunity possibly being enough
to defeat employee status.74
Professor Jeffrey M. Hirsch has questioned whether the focus on
entrepreneurial opportunity is the start of a new test. He has cautioned that
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01(2)–(3).
68. Id. at § 1.01 cmt. d (citing Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780
(D.C. Cir. 2002)) (stating that the critical distinction between employee and independent
contractor is “the degree to which each functions as an entrepreneur-that is, takes economic
risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just
harder.”); NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097–99 (9th Cir. 2008) (placing
particular significance on the fact that drivers cannot engage in entrepreneurial opportunities
and that they lack a substantial investment in property); see also Estrada v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that drivers are
employees because they do not have a separate business and are not given a “true
entrepreneurial opportunity”).
69. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
70. Id. at 497 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 497.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 504 (Garland, J., dissenting).
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by focusing on entrepreneurial “opportunity,” as opposed to actual
engagement, this standard is subject to abuse by employers who may adopt
policies expressly accounting for putative independent contractors’
“entrepreneurial opportunities,” even though those opportunities may only
exist on paper.75
Any test, however, is subject to manipulation by employers who can
structure a putative job to either facilitate or avoid a finding of employee
status.76 I have previously questioned whether this “entrepreneurial
opportunity” standard was a new test and concluded that was simply an
offshoot of the common law test.77 In FedEx, the D.C. Circuit expressly
stated that it was retaining the common law test and simply focusing the
inquiry on entrepreneurialism.78 That holding is reasonable and justified
because the common law test itself does not consist of rigid factors set in
stone.79 Stated another way, entrepreneurial opportunity is simply another
factor that can be examined under the common law standard.
More fundamentally, because the Supreme Court in United Insurance
held that the common law test was applicable under the NLRA, the NLRB
and lower federal courts could not simply abandon this standard.80 While
75. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, New “Entrepreneurial Opportunity” Test for Independent
Contractor Status?, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad
.com/laborprof_blog/2009/week17/index.html; Hirsch, supra note 4, at 355; but see, Dilger,
supra note 3, at 148–49 (2010) (concluding that entrepreneurial opportunity is a new test of
employee status which has the potential to change the legal landscape because of the ability
of NLRB cases to be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit).
76. See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor
Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 279, 282–83 (2011)
(explaining that employers have the power to shape business practices to avoid unionization
by classifying individuals as independent contractors); David Millon, Keeping Hope Alive,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369, 370 (2011) (same); see also Glynn, supra note 18, at 104
(2011) (explaining that in order to reduce employment law liability exposure, employers
may shift work to third parties).
77. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 161 n.69 (2006).
78. FedEx, 563 F.3d at 497.
79. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (quoting NLRB
v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)) (stating that since the common
law test contains “no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the
answer [with respect to the definition of an employee], . . . all of the incidents of the
relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.”); Salamon,
2008 WL 2609712, at *1060 (same).
In section 220(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), which outlined the
factors courts should examine in determining whether or not an individual is an employee, it
was recognized that those factors were not the only ones that could be considered. The
Restatement of Agency standard is essentially the same common law standard adopted by
the Supreme Court in Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52
(1989) and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 323–24. The Restatement of Agency was
the closest analogy to employment law before the adoption of the Restatement of
Employment.
80. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
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none of the more recent Supreme Court decisions on employee status
discuss the issue of entrepreneurialism, language can be found in United
Insurance to support the propriety of entrepreneurialism as a factor in the
common law analysis. Specifically, the Court stated in United Insurance
that “[o]n the other hand, however, they do not have the independence, nor
are they allowed the initiative and decision-making authority, normally
associated with an independent contractor.”81 The phrase “initiative and
decision-making authority” can be read as a suggestion to look at
entrepreneurial opportunity that a putative independent contractor may
possess as a factor in the common law analysis.
There is thin support for concluding that entrepreneurial opportunity
should be characterized as a new test. Indeed, it appears that despite the
D.C. Circuit decision, NLRB decisions are continuing to apply the
traditional “right to control” test.82 In the NLRB’s recent decision
concerning independent contractor status, it expressly stated that one of the
factors in determining independent contractor status was whether or not the
individual bears an entrepreneurial risk of loss and opportunity for
entrepreneurial gain.83 At most, the issue of entrepreneurial opportunity
and risk is an additional factor to look at, but not a separate test.84 Of
course, while the above discussion primarily involved NLRB case law,
there is no reason why the same form of analysis would not apply to other
areas of employment law.
B.

Statutory or Primary Purpose Test

The Supreme Court has also looked to the primary purpose of a
particular employment statute to determine whether or not certain
individuals should be covered as employees. The statutory or primary
purpose test is considered broader than the common law standard.85 In
81. Id. at 258.
82. See Dilger, supra note 3, at 124 (citation omitted); see also BWI Taxi Mgmt., Inc.,
NLRB Case No. 5-RC-16489, 2010 WL 4836874 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 16, 2010) (providing
example of NLRB decision continuing to apply right to control test).
83. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 357 NLRB No. 152 (Dec. 23, 2011).
84. Lancaster Symphony did not cite to FedEx or even discuss the issue of whether or
not entrepreneurial opportunity involved the application of a new test for independent
contractor status. Id. Additionally, the majority in Lancaster Symphony disagreed with the
dissent with respect to exactly what constitutes entrepreneurial opportunity.
Id.
Specifically, the majority held that the fact that the symphony orchestra musicians, whose
status was at issue in this case, could decide to work more and therefore, earn more, was not
indicative of entrepreneurial opportunity. The dissent considered this factor as indicative of
entrepreneurial opportunity based on the idea that by controlling how much they work, they
control how much they make. One can expect additional litigation focused on exactly what
constitutes entrepreneurial opportunity.
85. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992).
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NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the Court held that independent
contractors were not excluded from the definition of employee under the
NLRA.86 The Court rejected the common law test because it resulted in
inconsistent rulings.87 The Court explained this test of employee status as
follows:
Whether, given the intended national uniformity, the term
‘employee’ includes such workers as these newsboys must be
answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the
legislation. The word ‘is not treated by Congress as a word of art
having a definite meaning . . . .’ Rather, ‘it takes color from its
surroundings [in] the statute where it appears,’ and derives
meaning from the context of that statute, which ‘must be read in
light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.’88
Significantly, however, in that same decision, the Court indicated that
in doubtful cases, courts could examine “underlying economic facts” and
“economic relationships” which blurs the distinction between the primary
purpose test and what later became known as the economic reality test.89
It is important to note that in 1947, the NLRA was amended to
exclude independent contractors from the definition of employee.90
However, that does not diminish the importance of the Court’s analysis,
particularly when one considers the fact that Congress provided little
guidance with respect to distinguishing between independent contractors
and employees.91
More recently, and outside the NLRA, the Supreme Court in Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., seems to have once again approved of a type of primary
purpose test.92 There, the Court was faced with having to decide whether
the anti-retaliation provisions in Title VII applied to former employees who
were given a negative post-employment reference.93 In holding that the
term “employee” applied to former employees, the Court reasoned in part:

86. 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944).
87. Id. at 123.
88. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 128–29. Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to describe the test adopted by
the Supreme Court in Hearst as an “economic realities” test. Zatz, supra note 76, at 281.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (2006); see NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254,
256 (1968) (discussing this statutory amendment to the definition of employee). In United
Insurance, the Court adopted the common law test in defining employee status under the
NLRA. Id.
91. See Zatz, supra note 76, at 281 (explaining that the NLRA statutory amendments
did not provide significant guidance with respect to how to draw the line between
employees and independent contractors).
92. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
93. Id. at 339.
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According to the EEOC, exclusion of former employees from the
protection of § 704(a) would undermine the effectiveness of Title
VII by allowing the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter
victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and
would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire
employees who might bring Title VII claims. Those arguments
carry persuasive force given their coherence and their
consistency with a primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions:
Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.
The EEOC quite persuasively maintains that it would be
destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an
employer to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire
class of acts under Title VII—for example, complaints regarding
discriminatory termination. We agree with these contentions and
find that they support the inclusive interpretation of ‘employees’
in § 704(a) that is already suggested by the broader context of
Title VII.94
Similarly, in Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, in examining if a
husband and mother of a restaurant owner were employees for purposes of
whether the restaurant met the numerical employee threshold, the Seventh
Circuit relied in part upon the underlying purposes of Title VII. 95 I have
previously explained that the NLRB, at times, has looked to the primary
purpose of the NLRA to determine whether or not certain individuals are
employees protected under the law.96
In a fairly well-known FLSA case, Judge Easterbrook in a
concurrence criticized both the common law right to control test and the
economic reality test as unfocused and unpredictable.97 He advocated a
return to a standard where employee status is determined by examining the
putative employee responsibilities and comparing that to the underlying
purposes of the statute.98 Thus, Judge Easterbrook essentially advocates for
the adoption of the statutory purpose test. This demonstrates that the
statutory purpose test may still be a relevant consideration in determining
employment status even if the court is not applying it exclusively.

94. Id. at 346 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
95. 453 F.3d 971, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2006); see also EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Statutory purpose is [a] relevant” factor courts
could consider in determining whether partners in a large law firm should be treated as
employees or employers).
96. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 164–65 (2006).
97. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539–40 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring).
98. Id.
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Economic Realities Test

By contrast, the economic realities test focuses on “whether the
employee, as a matter of economic reality, is dependent upon the business
to which he [or she] renders service.”99
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted this standard in an early
FLSA case because it approved of the lower court’s statement that the
common law test did not apply because “the Act concerns itself with the
correction of economic evils through remedies which were unknown at
common law . . . [and] the ‘underlying economic realities . . . lead to the
conclusion that the boners were and are employees of Kaiser . . . .’”100
Given that the Supreme Court did expressly state that it was adopting the
economic realities test, it is not entirely clear that the Court actually
intended to adopt a new standard or test.101
In any event, the Supreme Court eventually expressly adopted the
economic reality test in a case examining whether volunteers were covered
by the FLSA.102 Unfortunately, the Court’s decision did not clearly define
this standard or provide much guidance with respect to how courts should
distinguish between employees and non-employees.103
Later, the Fifth Circuit issued a lengthy, well-written opinion where it
extensively examined and discussed the economic realities test. The court
explained that this test involved an examination of the following factors:
99. Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994).
100. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–27 (1947) (quoting Walling
v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516–17 (10th Cir. 1946)).
101. See Stone, supra note 22, at 257 (describing economic realities test and collecting
authorities).
102. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (citations
omitted).
103. Id. at 301. The Court described this test as follows:
The test of employment under the Act is one of ‘economic reality’. . . . Whereas
in Portland Terminal, the training course lasted a little over a week, in this case
the associates were ‘entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long periods, in
some cases several years’. . . . Under the circumstances, the District Court’s
finding that the associates must have expected to receive in-kind benefits— and
expected them in exchange for their services—is certainly not clearly erroneous.
Under Portland Terminal, a compensation agreement may be ‘implied’ as well
as ‘express’ . . .and the fact that the compensation was received primarily in the
form of benefits rather than cash is in this context immaterial.
Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (citations
omitted). Many lower courts, in turn, have adopted the economic realities test in FLSA
cases. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 335 F.3d 61, 66–67 (2d. Cir. 2003) (applying
economic reality test in FLSA case); accord, Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am, 545 F.3d 338,
343 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1635 (2009). See also Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of
Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2004) (adopting economic reality test under Title
VII).
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(1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2)
the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the
alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the worker’s
opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged
employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the
job; and (5) the permanency of the relationship. No single factor
is determinative. Rather each factor is a tool used to gauge the
economic dependence of the alleged employee, and each must be
applied with this ultimate concept in mind.104
The economic realities test has been described by several well-known
authors in a Casebook as the default test under federal protective legislation
when the statute gives little guidance with respect to the appropriate test of
employee status, though there is considerable authority which indicates that
the common law right to control is the default standard.105 In any event,
this illustrates that this it is important to be aware of this test.
The economic realities test has been criticized as a “rearticulat[ion]
and appl[ication of] common law agency principles.”106 Indeed, the very
first factor noted above concerns the right of control which is a central part
of the common law test.107 It should be noted that the economic realities
test was originally developed to be more expansive than the common law
test.108
D.

Hybrid Test

The hybrid test combines both the common law and economic realities
tests and attempts to steer a middle ground.109 There has been widespread
adoption of this test, particularly under Title VII. 110 However, a number of
104. Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also
Thibault v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc, 612 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 2010) (following Hopkins);
Strom v. Strom Closures, Inc., No. 06-C-7051, 2008 WL 4852998, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7,
2008) (adopting a multi-factor economic reality test under FLSA and state wage and hour
statute).
105. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30, at 42. But see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (stating in the context of ERISA that the common law standard is
the default test of employee status where Congress has not spoken)
106. Perry v. City of Country Club Hills, 607 F. Supp. 771, 773 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
107. See also Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831–32 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying the
economic realities test to a Title VII case, but the court also states that the right of the
putative employer to control work is a critical factor).
108. MARK ROTHSTEIN, CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER & ELAINE W.
SHOBEN, 1 EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.3 (3d ed. 2005); see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (noting
that the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not
qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”); Hopkins,
545 F.2d at 343 (stating that the definition of employee under FLSA is particularly broad).
109. Mosley, supra note 10, at 636–37.
110. Id. at 638. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Supervision, 479 F.3d 377,
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courts have also rejected the adoption of this test in light of the statement in
Darden, which indicated that the common law test is the default standard
where Congress has not specified an appropriate standard.111 The use of the
hybrid test is also questionable under Title VII because in Walters v.
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court arguably
indirectly approved of one of the party’s arguments, which called for the
adoption of the common law test of agency.112 It is by no means entirely
clear, however, that the Supreme Court actually meant to approve of this
standard because the Court did not expressly state whether it agreed with
that part of the argument.113 On the other hand, in Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., the Court, in a Title VII retaliation case, approved of the primary
purpose test.114 With these caveats in mind, it is important to explain what
the hybrid test entails as many courts still apply it. One court described the
hybrid test as follows:
In determining whether an employment relationship exists within
the meaning of Title VII and the ADEA, we apply a ‘hybrid
economic realities/common law control test.’ The right to
control an employee’s conduct is the most important component
of this test. When examining the control component, we have
focused on whether the alleged employer has the right to hire and
fire the employee, the right to supervise the employee, and the
right to set the employee’s work schedule. The economic
realities component of our test has focused on whether the
alleged employer paid the employee’s salary, withheld taxes,
provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of
employment.115

380 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To determine whether an employment relationship exists within the
meaning of Title VII, we apply a hybrid economic realities/common law control test.”)
(internal citation and quotation omitted); EEOC v. Zippo Mfr., Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d.
Cir. 1983) (mentioning the use of hybrid test for Title VII cases); see also Hill v. City of
Austin Pub. Works, No. A-08-CV-079 LY, 2008 WL 750566, at *2 (W.D. Texas Mar. 19,
2008) (utilizing the hybrid test to find that workers were not employees of plaintiffemployer); D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 927 A.2d 113, 121 (N.J. 2007) (utilizing
hybrid test under the state whistleblower statute).
111. Stouch v. Bros. of Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 836 F. Supp. 1134, 1139
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (“Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court held that in statutes
where Congress does not helpfully define ‘employee,’ courts should use the common-law
agency test”) (citation omitted).
112. 519 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997).
113. Id. at 212–13. See also Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 84 (1st Cir. 2009)
(holding that Walters adopted the common law test under Title VII).
114. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (discussing Shell Oil and primary
purpose test).
115. Deal v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 5 F.3d 117, 118–19 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted); accord, Roque v. Jazz Casino, 388 Fed. Appx. 402 (5th Cir. 2010); see also
Martin v. UT Southwestern Med. Ctr., 3:07-CV-1663-0, 2009 WL 77871, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
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In Magallanes v. Penske Logisitcs, the court utilized the hybrid test to
find that an individual who worked at a company that supplied a truck and
a truck driver pursuant to a contract with another company was an
employee of the original company and not the contractor.116 This is
notwithstanding the fact that he was assigned to work at the contracting
company and the contractor instructed him as to when and where to deliver
the goods.117 Though several elements of control were exercised by the
contracting company, on balance the court held that he was economically
dependent on the first company.118
As I have explained elsewhere, it makes no sense, from a public
policy perspective to have multiple tests for employee status.119 Indeed,
because different statutes and different tests are involved, an individual can
be an employee for some purposes, but an independent contractor for
others.120 Thus, for example, an employee can be considered an employee
under the NLRA, but not under other statutes.121
One Circuit, while acknowledging this problem referred to it merely
as a “semantic inconsistency.”122 While I am not exactly sure what the
court meant by that, I do note that several academic commentators123 and
Jan. 12, 2009) (applying the hybrid test in Title VII case); Hathcock v. Acme Truck Lines,
Inc., 262 F.3d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 928 (2002) (discussing the
hybrid test)..
116. Magallanes v. Penske Logistics LLC, 570 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 912–13.
119. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 169–70 (2006).
120. Id. at 151 (citing Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2002))
(holding that an individual was an employee under NLRA even though he was not paid the
minimum wage and did not receive tax form W-2); see also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am,
545 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that it is not inconsistent to be considered an
employee under the FLSA, but an independent contractor under other statutes); City Cab
Co. of Orlando, 285 N.L.R.B. 1191, 1193 (1987) (holding that employee status
determinations of other governmental agencies are not controlling, but should be given
consideration by the NLRB). But see Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., No.
06-CV-1495, 2009 WL 3602008 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 2780927, No.
09-4498 (3d Cir. July 15, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 925 (2011) (noting that all parties
agreed that Title VII, the FLSA, and state human rights law should be similarly interpreted
with respect to employee and employer status).
121. This does not happen often, but it does happen. See BWI Taxi Mgmt, No. 5-RC4836874, 2010 WL 4836874, at *9 n.15 (NLRB Reg. Dir. Sept. 16, 2010) (stating that the
petitioner received a letter saying he was an independent contractor under the EEOC, but
was considered an employee under the NLRA); Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 761–62 (holding
individual was an employee even though he was treated as an independent contractor for tax
purposes in that he did not receive a W-2 tax form).
122. Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 347.
123. Jeff Clement, Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia: An Out Of Tune Definition
of “Employee” Keeps Freelance Musicians From Being Covered By Title VII, 3 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 489, 509 (2005); Maltby, supra note 19, at 254; Valerie L. Jacobson,
Bringing A Title VII Action: Which Test Regarding Standing To Sue Is The Most
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courts124 have stated that there is very little substantive difference between
each of the various tests of employee status.
The multitude of various tests is still a serious problem, however,
because even a small difference can lead to a different result.
Unfortunately, despite a formal commission being established in the
Clinton Administration to examine our nation’s employment laws and
despite a specific recommendation being made for one uniform definition
of employee status, (which was the economic realities test), Congress has
not acted.125
Finally, with respect to the distinction between employees and
independent contractors, U.S. courts tend to focus on specific tests, which
can be somewhat wooden.126 However, it is worth noting that the problem
of employee status is not a uniquely American problem. 127 Some countries
have developed intermediate categories. In Germany, for example,
“employee-like persons” may be covered by labor legislation as
“parasubordinated” persons, and “dependent contractors” may be covered
in Italy and Canada respectively.128 If Congress were ever to seriously
consider evaluating the problem of defining who an employee is, perhaps
something can be learned from other industrialized nations.
III. WHO IS AN EMPLOYER?
A.

Private Sector vs. Public Sector Employers

Fundamentally, when dealing with any question of labor and
employment law, one of the first questions to be examined is whether or
not a private or public employer is involved. Quite simply certain statutes
may not be applicable if the putative employer is an arm of government.129
Applicable?, 18 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 95, 108 (1990).
124. Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F. 3d 175, 175 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009); Lambertsen v. Utah
Dep’t of Corrs., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996); Wilde v. County of Kaniyohi, 15 F.3d
103, 106 (8th Cir. 1994); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d. Cir. 1993); Burt v.
Broyhill Furniture Indus., No. CV-04-2929-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2711495 (D. Ariz. Sept.
18, 2006).
125. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 170. Specifically, in 1993 a formal commission headed
by former Labor Secretary John Dunlop was established to examine the U.S. labor market
and make recommendations to Congress.
One of the Dunlop Commission’s
recommendations was the adoption of a single uniform definition of employee. Id. (citing
U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS—FINAL REPORT 64–66
(1994)).
126. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30, at 45.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. For example, ERISA only applies to private sector pension plans. Wilmington
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The converse is also true.130
The private/public sector issue can arise under a number of different
employment statutes, but is most often litigated under the NLRA and
therefore, this Article will focus on NLRA standards as examples.131 The
NLRA is the grandfather of most of today’s labor and employment laws.
As such, courts adjudicating labor and employment issues often look to
decisions under the NLRA for guidance.132
Section 2(2) of the NLRA, as amended,133 excludes “political
subdivisions” from the coverage under the Act and it is this exclusion that
is often litigated. However, the term “political subdivision” is not defined
in the statute.134 The exemption has been construed by the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dis. of Hawkins County to be limited to
entities that are either (1) created directly by the State so as to constitute
departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered
by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general
electorate.135 This exemption is considered narrow.136
For example, the NLRB found that the State Bar of New Mexico was
directly created by the New Mexico Supreme Court and was an
administrative arm of the judicial branch of government. Therefore, it was
exempt under Hawkins first prong.137 Similarly, a hospital that was
established by a city and continued to operate pursuant to a local law was
exempt from NLRB jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that it had an
autonomous board of trustees.138
Shipping Co. v. New England Life Ins. Co., 496 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2007).
130. For example, certain Whistleblower protection statutes only apply in the public
sector. See, e.g., New York Civil Service Law § 75-b. Additionally, neither causes of
action under the First Amendment, George v. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings, 522
F.Supp.2d 761, 764 (N.D. W. Va. 2007), nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983, German v. Fox, 267 Fed.
Appx. 231 (4th Cir. 2008), apply to private employers.
131. See, e.g., New York Pub. Library v. New York Pub. Emp’t. Relations Bd., 374
N.Y.S. 2d 625 (1975) (holding employees employed by a public library were not public
employees under the New York Taylor law, Civil Service § 200 et seq.).
132. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Duty of Fair Representation Jurisprudential Reform, The
Need To Adjudicate Disputes In Internal Union Review Tribunals and The Forgotten
Remedy of Re-Arbitration, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 517, 542, 543 n.121 (2009).
133. Section 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. s 152(2), provides: “The term “employer”
includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof . . . .”
134. NLRB v. Princeton Mem’l Hosp, 939 F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1991).
135. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 402 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1971);
NLRB v. Austin Developmental Ctr., Inc., 606 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1979).
136. Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective
Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y. 885, 924 (2007).
137. State Bar of New Mexico, 346 N.L.R.B. 674 (2006).
138. Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 945 (1975).
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Under Hawkins County, an entity can satisfy the second prong only if
a majority of its board of directors is responsible to the general
electorate.139 They must be appointed and subject to removal by public
officials.140 Under this standard, the NLRB routinely asserts jurisdiction
over private employers that contract with the government to provide
governmental type services.141
For example, a non-profit corporation that administered public
research grants for the City University of New York, a public university,
was not an exempt political subdivision where the employer was
administered by its own board of directors, a majority of which were not
responsible to the electorate.142 Similarly, a non-profit tax exempt
corporation that provided educational and management services to public
school academies was not exempt from the National Labor Relations
Act.143
Issues involving the distinction between private and public employers
can also arise under a host of other statutes including state labor relations
acts such as New York’s Taylor Law.144 One such developing area
concerns the status of Charter Schools. The New York Public Employment
Relations Board, the administrative agency responsible for administering
the Taylor Law, has held that Charter Schools are public schools and, as
such, are subject to jurisdiction under the Taylor Law.145 The New York
statutory scheme states that Charter Schools are public schools.146
Similarly, an NLRB Regional Director held that a Chicago Charter School,
designated by state statute as a public school, was a public employer and

139. FiveCap, Inc., v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2002).
140. Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., Inc., 353 NLRB No. 35, at *5 (2008); Research Found.
of CUNY, 337 N.L.R.B. 965, 969 (2002).
141. Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., 353 NLRB at *6. The circuits have regularly agreed
with the NLRB’s assertion of jurisdiction in such cases. Id. at n.23.
142. Research Found. of CUNY, 337 N.L.R.B. at 969 (2002); see also Conn. State
Conference Bd., 339 NLRB 760 (2003) (discussing whether employer that has contract with
state of Connecticut to provide public bus service is subject to the jurisdiction of NLRB);
Family Healthcare, Inc., 354 NLRB No. 29 (2009) (non-profit corporation that operated
medical clinics where eighty percent of its funding was received from Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement was found not to be an exempt political subdivision).
143. Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., 353 NLRB at *1; see also FiveCap, Inc., v. NLRB, 294
F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2002) (non-profit welfare agency that received public funding not
exempt political subdivision as a majority of its board of directors was not responsible to
general electorate). But see, Council of School Supervisors, 44 PERB ¶ 3001 (2011)
(holding that Charter Schools are public employers notwithstanding the fact that they have a
type of joint employment relationship with a private management company).
144. N.Y. Civil Service Law § 200 et. seq.
145. In re Council of School Supervisors, 44 PERB ¶ 3001 (2011).
146. See N.Y. Education Law § 2854.3(a) (expressly defining Charter Schools as public
employers).
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therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. An appeal before the
full Board is pending.147
As this Article goes to print, however, the legal status of Charter
Schools around the country remains unsettled. This is because as PERB
recognized, federal courts have the ultimate authority with respect to
NLRA preemption.148 The federal courts have not yet addressed the status
of Charter Schools.
B.

Employer Definitions

When one gets beyond the distinction between public and private
sector employers, cases involving the definition of an employer are, like the
definition of employee, somewhat elusive. As with employee status,149 a
contractual disclaimer of employer status is not conclusively binding.150
Little academic commentary addresses employer status, yet this issue has
spawned a significant litigation.151
While we know that the
misclassification of employees is profuse, there is no current nationwide
data which documents just how wide spread a problem this is with respect
to employers.
The existing data mainly concerns misclassification under the IRS
Code, and Department of Labor data suggests that as much as ten and thirty
percent of employers misclassify their employees.152 A New York State
Survey estimated that approximately 10.3% of workers in that state are
misclassified.153 A survey of Maine construction employers put that
number at fourteen percent.154 Given these numbers one can extrapolate
that employer misclassification is a significant issue as well.

147. Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter Sch., Inc., 13-RM-1768 (Sept.
20, 2010); Press Release, NLRB (Jan. 10, 2011) (stating that the NLRB will be reviewing
this case and inviting briefs to discuss status of Charter Schools).
148. In re Council of School Supervisors, 44 PERB ¶ 3001 (2011).
149. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., J.J. Gumberg Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 889 (1971); Met. Chicago, Inc., 13-RC20098 (Nov. 12, 1999); accord, La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 1120 (2002),
enforced without op., 71 Fed. Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003) (where NLRB refuses to find joint
employer relationship notwithstanding the fact that parties previously entered into a NLRB
stipulated election agreement defining bargaining unit).
151. For an extensive review of the applicable case law for determining whether or not
an entity is an employer under Title VII, see Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d
971 (7th Cir. 2006). See also Annotation, When Are Separate Business Entities “Joint
Employers” of Same Employees For Purposes Of Application of Federal Labor Laws, 73
A.L.R. Fed. 609, § 2(a) (1985).
152. See EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 25.
153. DONAHUE, LAMARE & KOTLER, supra note 23, at 8.
154. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has stated that an employer is “the person, or
group of persons, who own and manage the enterprise.”155 Many courts,
however, simply focus on the definition of an “employee”156 and only pay
lip service to the statutory definition of “employer” by only examining
whether the employer meets the statute’s numerosity requirements.157 The
Fifth Circuit, for example, has characterized the applicable test in a Title
VII case as follows:
Determining whether a defendant is an “employer” under Title
VII or the ADEA involves a two-step process. First, the
defendant must fall within the statutory definition. Second, there
must be an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
To determine whether an employment relationship exists within
the meaning of Title VII, we apply a hybrid economic
realities/common law control test.158
Other courts simply cite to one of the tests for employee status, such
as the economic realities test159 or the common law right to control test.160
155. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003).
156. Indeed, in examining the definition of an employer under Section 2(2) of the
NLRA, the leading treatise on labor law focuses on determining who is an employee under
the Act. See HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2241–42.
157. Indeed, that is what the Supreme Court did in Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 454, in
examining whether a small medical practice was subject to jurisdiction under the ADA.
158. Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted) (ADEA and Title VII case); see also, Johnson v. Manpower Professional
Services, Inc., 442 Fed. Appx. 977 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying same hybrid test in Title VII &
42 U.S.C. § 1981 case); Muhammad v. Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Supervision & Corrs. Dep’t, 479
F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (purporting to apply this test to Title VII case); Hill v. City of
Austin Public Works, No. A-08-CV-079 LY, 2008 WL 750566, at *2 (W.D. Texas 2008),
aff’d, 360 Fed Appx. 582 (5th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 461 (2010)
(applying hybrid test in Title VII case); Thomson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1329,
1334 n.8 (D. Kans. 1994) (applying hybrid test in Title VII and state law case).
159. Rodriquez v. Jones Boat Yard, No. 10-15326, 2011 WL 3252569 (11th Cir. July 26,
2011) (FLSA case); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 1999) (FLSA
case); Hale v. Ariz., 993 F. 2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (FLSA case); St. John v. NCI
Bldg. Sys., 537 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d. on other grounds, 299 Fed. Appx.
308 (5th Cir. 2008) (ADA case); Callais v. Shell Oil Co., No. 10-2105, 2011 WL 3490064
(E.D. La. 2011) (Title VII case).
160. Shah v. Bank of America, 346 Fed. Appx. 831, 2009 WL 415619, at *6–7 (D. Del.
Feb. 18, 2009) (applying common law right to control test to employee in order to determine
whether or not defendant was plaintiffs employer under Title VII); King’s Brass Ceremonial
v. Comm’r of Labor, 904 N.Y.S. 2d 543 (App. Div. 2010) (explaining that in determining
whether an entity was liable for unemployment insurance contributions, the court looks to
see if an employment relationship exists by applying common law right to control test);
Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 378 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying common law test
in Title VII case); accord, Forsythe v. NYC Dep’t of Citywide Admin. Servs., 733 F. Supp.
2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, No. 10–3230–cv, 2011 WL 2473496 (2d Cir. 2011) (in
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Indeed in a recent article, a well-known employment scholar, Timothy
Glynn, in discussing employer status simply cited to the Restatement’s
common law test.161 Additionally, in one high profile case when faced with
the issue of whether law firm partners were employers or employees, the
court focused simply on whether or not the partners were in fact
employees-not whether they met the definition of employer.162
In Gulino, the Second Circuit issued an important decision that
illustrated this principle of employer status.163 The court was faced with
whether the State Education Department could be held liable as an
employer under Title VII because it developed a certification test that
teachers had to pass in order to receive a license. Though the court was
faced squarely with the issue of whether the State Education Department
was an employer under Title VII, the court simply looked to whether the
plaintiffs in question where employees under the applicable test for
employee status.
The court ultimately held that the plaintiffs were not employees
because they could not meet the threshold showing that the State Education
Department hired and compensated them. Additionally, a master-servant
relationship was not established under the common law right to control
test.164
There is also some Supreme Court precedent under the FLSA that
supports the notion that employer status can be determined by looking to
determining whether or not joint employer status was established, the court held that such a
relationship exists where there is sufficient evidence that one entity had immediate control
over another company’s employees) (citations omitted).
161. Glynn, supra note 18, at 108 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220 and
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07(3)(a)).
162. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 707 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2006) (same). But see Kirleis v.
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 2009 WL 3602008, No. 06-CV-1495, at *2 n.4 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, No. 09-498, 2010 WL 2780927 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S.Ct. 935 (2011) (relying on Clackamas factors to distinguish between attorney shareholder
employers and attorney shareholder employees and holding that shareholder attorney was an
employer); see also N.Y. Hotel & Casino, 356 NLRB No. 119 (2011) (focusing on the
definition of employee in holding that under certain circumstances, a third party employer
can commit an unfair labor practice with respect to employees of a contractor). In another
high profile litigation, the EEOC settled a case alleging that a law firm’s mandatory
retirement policy violated the ADEA and therefore, the court did not have to decide whether
law firm partners were employees. See, Joseph Palazzolo, Kelley Drye Settles with EEOC
over
Age
Bias
Claims,
Wall
Street
Journal
Law
Blog,
blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/04/10/kelley-drye-settles-with-eeoc-over-age-bias-claims/ (April
10, 2012).
163. 460 F.3d at 378.
164. Id. at 379. As the court explained: SED does have some control over New York
City school teachers—e.g., it controls basic curriculum and credentialing requirements—but
SED does not exercise the workday supervision necessary to an employment relationship.
Id.
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employee status, but the Court did not directly hold that employer status is
determined by examining employee status.165 Unfortunately, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly defined the term “employer.”
The closest the Supreme Court has come in defining who an employer
is was in Clackamus Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells,166 where the
Court had to address whether a small medical practice was an employer
under the ADA. In deciding the case, the Court did not focus on the
definition of employer under the statute, but instead focused on the
definition of an employee.
This is understandable in this case, as well as in some of the others,
because the issue was whether the medical practice met the ADA’s
employee-numerosity requirement of having fifteen or more employees.167
The ADA, like most employment statutes,168 simply defined an employer as
having “15 or more employees for each working day.”169 If the four
physician shareholders counted, then the practice would be subject to the
ADA.
The Court struggled with whether or not the shareholders were
employees. The Court stated that the definition of an employee under the
165. In Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961), the Court, in
examining whether or not a cooperative was an employer and its members who mostly
worked at home were employees under the FLSA, saw “nothing inherently inconsistent
between the coexistence of a proprietary and an employment relationship.” Id. at 32. In
making a determination as to employment status, the Court stated that “‘economic reality’
rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the test of employment.” Id. at 33. Thus, the Court
appears to have not seen a distinction between the test of employee and employer status.
Accord, Xue Liam Lin v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6519 (PKC),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64625, slip op. at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (stating that in
determining employer status under FLSA, the overarching concern is whether the employer
has the power to control workers with an eye towards the economic reality of the facts).
Whitaker House may not be of much significance outside of the context of the FLSA.
Section 3(g) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), defines the term “employ” as to “suffer or
permit work” and that statutory language is not included in most other employment laws.
That language is also considered to be particularly broad. Barfield v. NYC Health & Hosp.
Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2008). The issue in this case also had to do with the
validity of a regulation concerning industrial homework.
166. 538 U.S. at 440. Indeed, the Court noted in a footnote that it was distinguishing
between an employee and an employer. Id. at 445 n.5.
167. The term “employee-numerosity requirement,” as far as I can tell, is a phrase coined
by the Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 505 (2006). The actual
counting of employees is not as simple as it may seem when one considers that employees
may be hired and discharged by an employer and some employees work part-time. See
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 108 (discussing how to count employees for the purpose of
defining employer status). I have previously noted the importance of numerosity
requirements in employment law. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 151–52.
168. See EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 25 (quoting the definition of
employer contained in various statutes); See also Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519
U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (discussing definitions of employer under Title VII).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2006).
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statute—“an individual employed by an employer”170—was “nominal,” that
it is “completely circular and explains nothing.”171 The Court then had to
determine the appropriate test that it would apply.
The Court refused to adopt the common law right to control test that it
had earlier adopted in an ERISA case,172 because the issue did not involve
the line between employees and independent contractors. Rather, the issue
the Court was faced with was “whether a shareholder-director is an
employee or, alternatively, the kind of person that the common law would
consider an employer.”173
Nevertheless, the Court did recognize that the common law right to
control standard provided helpful guidance and adopted the position of the
EEOC, which implied that shareholders could not be employees. The
Court adopted the EEOC’s six-factor, non-exhaustive test (which does not
have a name), in haec verba that examines:
1. Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set
the rules and regulations of the individual’s work; and
2. Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises
the individual’s work; and
3. Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization; and
4. Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to
influence the organization; and
5. Whether the parties intended that the individual be an
employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts;
and
6. Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and
liabilities of the organization.174
The Court also recognized that titles are not controlling and that there
is no “shorthand formula or magic phrase” that could provide a quick
answer with respect to employer status. Rather, the issue is to be resolved
by looking at the totality of the circumstances.175
Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Breyer, wrote an
important dissent where she did not see anything inherently inconsistent
170. Id. § 12111(4).
171. 538 U.S. at 444.
172. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (citing Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 730 (1989)).
173. Id. at 445.
174. Id. at 626; see also De Jesus v. LTT Card Servs., Inc., 474 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir.
2007) (holding that Clackamus applies to both cases under the ADA as well as Title VII).
175. Id.; see also Feldmann v N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 4:09-CV-2129 MLM, 2011 WL
382201, at *9 (E.D. Mo, Feb. 3, 2011) (stating that under Title VII whether an individual is
an employee or an independent contractor “requires more than simply tallying factors on
each side and selecting the winner on the basis of a point score”) (quoting Lerohl v. Friends
of Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 2003)).
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between individuals having both proprietary and employment relationships.
This is because the physician-shareholders often functioned as common
law employees.176
In an exhaustive law review article which discusses the employer
status of shareholders and partners, Professor Ann McGinley has criticized
Clackamas precisely on this point. Professor McGinley reasoned that
many partners work for the partnership in the same fashion as
employees.177 As Professor McGinley explains:
Although the vice president or other upper level manager of a
corporation can be simultaneously an “employer” and an
“employee” under the anti-discrimination acts, the Court assumes
that a partner or shareholder cannot serve both roles of
“employer” and“employee.” The language of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA do not distinguish between partnerships
and general corporations in their definitions of who is a “person”
under the acts; neither does the statutory language distinguish
between partnerships and corporations as “employers.” It cannot
be correct, therefore, that partners are not “employees” merely
because they are “employers.”178
The very next year, however, Justice Ginsburg voted with the majority
in a case that dealt with whether a working owner, who was the sole
shareholder and president of a professional corporation, was a “participant”
under ERISA. The Court rejected the notion that business owners could
only be considered employers under ERISA.179
ERISA defines
“participant” as “any employee or former employee of an employer.”180
The Court, however, did not discuss the common law or other
employment law tests, which dominated Clackamas, but instead simply
focused on the language of ERISA. Thus, under ERISA a participant can
be an employer and an employee. However, beyond ERISA, under
Clackamas it would appear that an individual cannot be an employer and
an employee at the same time under most employment statutes.181
176. The Seventh Circuit has indicated that the purpose of the Clackamas test is to
distinguish between employers and employees. Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d
971, 979 n.4 (7th Cir. 2006).
177. Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as
“Employees” Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3, 34–35 (2004).
178. Id. Professor McGinley also noted that the anti-discrimination acts include “agents”
in the definition of “employer” and partners can be seen as agents of the employer. Id.
179. Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 6 (2004).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2006).
181. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., No. 06-CV-1495, 2009 WL
3602008 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, No. 09-4498, 2010 WL 2780927 (3d Cir. July 15,
2010) (holding that there is a threshold issue of employee status for the attorney partner
because if the partner is an employer he is not protected under Title VII, the FLSA and state
human rights law). Clackamas would not, however, prevent a partner from being
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Finally, it should be noted that the same issue of employment status is
involved when examining whether Board of Director members who also
work at the company may be subject to the control of the business just like
any other employee.182
IV. QUASI-EMPLOYERS
In most cases, coverage under our nation’s employment laws boils
down to the question of whether or not the individuals in question are
“employees” and whether or not the entity in question is an “employer.” In
fact, one important commentator referred to contemporary labor and
employment law as involving privity of contract between an employer and
employee as the basis for coverage under law.183
Significantly, however, there are a burgeoning number of cases184
where employer status is found in the absence of a direct relationship to a
statutory employer. I refer to these entities as quasi-employers because
they are not employers in the traditional sense, yet they are subject to the
dictates of employment law legislation.185
considered an employee if the person truly functioned as an employee, they just could not be
considered both under the statute. As the Court explains:
Today there are partnerships that include hundreds of members, some of
whom may qualify as “employees” because control is concentrated in a small
number of managing partners. Cf. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79
n.2, (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (‘[A]n employer may not evade the
strictures of Title VII simply be labeling its employees as partners.’); EECO v.
Sidley Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 709 (CA7 2002) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Strother v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859 (CA9 1996). Thus, asking whether
shareholder-directors are partners—rather than asking whether they are
employees—simply begs the question.
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 (2003).
182. Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 986 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Kern
v. City of Rochester, 93 F. 3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that while Board members are
generally considered employers under Title VII, they can be considered employees
depending upon their responsibilities); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529,
1539–40 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that Board of Director members were employees under
ADEA because each performed traditional employee duties, worked full-time and reported
to others).
183. Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside The Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527,
1537 (1996); see also Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 374 (2d Cir. 2006)
(indicating that a direct employment relationship is the typical Title VII case).
184. Indeed, one court has stated that there is an overwhelming amount of authority that
rejects the notion there must be a direct employment relationship between an employer and
an employer for Title VII liability to attach. Gore v. The RBA Group, No. 03-CV-9442,
2008 WL 857530, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (collecting cases).
185. Some courts are apparently unaware of this line of case law because they state that
Title VII “only” authorizes suit against employers, employment agencies, labor
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Employer Status in the Absence of a Direct Employment Relationship

While at first blush it might seem a bit odd to apply our nation’s
employment laws to entities that are not employers in the traditional sense,
upon close examination, there is quite a bit of support for this principle.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to apply to former employees
even though Title VII simply uses the term “employee.” Thus, former
employees could bring suit for post-employment retaliatory actions (such
as a negative employment reference).186 This demonstrates that the term
“employee,” and by extension the term “employer,” is not limited to
individuals who have a direct and explicit ongoing employment
relationship.
Additionally, Congress has chosen to regulate, through our labor laws,
situations where there is no direct employer-employee relationship in the
context of secondary activity of unions. Through its provisions on
secondary boycotts, the NLRA protects employers who are not themselves
the employer of the union employees in question. Rather, the NLRA
protects those employers that are simply doing business with an entity that
the union has a labor dispute with.187 The union is prohibited from
imposing significant secondary pressure, such as picketing, on that
“neutral” employer.188
Moreover, a similar legal concept to quasi-employer liability is the
“controlling employer” citation policy under the Occupational Safety and
organizations and training programs. Shah v. Bank of America, 598 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D.
Del. 2009), aff’d, 346 Fed. Appx. 831 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Scaglione v. Chappaqua
Cent. Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating “that direct
employment relationship is a necessary trait of a Title VII ‘employer’”); Burke v. Nalco
Chem. Co., No. 96-C-981, 1996 WL 411456, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1996) (stating that
“[a]n employer who does not fit within the FMLA’s definition is not bound by its terms.”).
186. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997). In holding that Title VII
applies to former employees, the Court noted that the statute does not contain any temporal
qualifier which indicates whether it applies to former employees, but the statute does
contain remedial provisions concerning reinstatement and hiring. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e5(g)(1) (2006) (containing the language discussed by the Court). Because current
employees are not normally reinstated, this supports the holding that Title VII applies to
former employees. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 347. The Court also looked to the purposes of
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions and reasoned that it would be destructive to the
statutory purpose if an employer were able to retaliate with impunity against former
employees. Id. at 349.
187. In labor relations parlance, the employer that the union has the dispute with is the
primary employer and the secondary employer that the union seeks to pressure is the entity
that has some type of relationship with the primary employer. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at
1741. The secondary employer is considered to be neutral. Id. at 1746.
188. See NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 614–15
(1980) (holding that union picketing aimed at customers of secondary employer is
prohibited unless picket signs expressly ask consumers not to purchase products of the
primary employer).
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Health Act (hereinafter “OSHA”).189 OSHA provides that a controlling
employer has a general duty to furnish a safe worksite for its own
employees as well as other employees on a multi-employer work site.190
The “controlling employer” citation policy provides that the agency
may issue citations to general contractors at construction sites that have the
ability to prevent or abate hazardous conditions, regardless of whether the
general contractor’s employees were involved.191 In effect, such general
contractors are quasi-employers because they do not directly employ the
subcontractors, yet they are subject to employment regulation. Some states
have enacted similar legislation with respect to liability for unpaid
wages.192
More fundamentally, the nature of work and American workplaces has
changed and will likely continue to change. There are fewer full-time
employees and more part-time employees, temporary employees,
independent contractors, and home workers.193 Today, there can even be
workers without workplaces,194 and some employees work together in
virtual worlds.195 Indeed, some believe that there is a movement away from
employees having long-term, established relationships with their employers
in favor of a more short-term contingent relationship.196
189. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–52 (2006).
190. Id. § 654; Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596, 599–600 (8th Cir. 1977).
191. Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding
Secretary of Labor’s controlling employer citation policy after extensively reviewing its
history and applicable case law). OSHA’s controlling employer policy is somewhat related
to case law examining whether or not an individual can be held liable as an employer under
the FLSA. In several FLSA cases, corporate officers and individuals with operational
control of the enterprise could be held responsible if they are involved in day to day
operations or have some direct responsibility for the employee in question. Patel v. Wargo,
803 F.2d 632, 637–38 (11th Cir. 1986); De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 581
F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2008). See infra notes 289–308 and accompanying text
(discussing supervisory liability under employment law statutes).
192. A California state law imposes liability on garment manufacturers if the employing
subcontractor is unable to pay even though the manufacturer does not have an employment
relationship with the subcontractor’s employees. Glynn, supra note 18, at 121 (citing CAL.
LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West 2010)). Illinois and New York have enacted similar legislation.
Id. at 121–22.
193. Mosley, supra note 10; see also Stone, supra note 22.
194. An example of workers without a workplace would be home workers and
telecommuters. See Stone, supra note 22, at 271 (discussing increasing use of home
workers and telecommuters). An example of employees without employers would be
individuals who work for small employers that do not meet the numerosity requirements
under a given statute, as well as independent contractors who may work side to side with
employees. See id. (discussing the changing nature of the workplace). The notion that the
American workplace is undergoing change is hardly new. See Becker, supra note 183
(arguing that existing legal doctrines are ineffective in regulating new forms of work).
195. Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011)
(discussing in detail the new forms of work that are arising due to technological advances).
196. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30.
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In the workplaces of the future, litigation with respect to the status of
employers is likely to continue because relationships will be increasingly
atypical and will not involve a direct employer-employee relationship. It
is, therefore, important to examine the status of quasi-employers.197
Several courts have recognized that the term “employer” is not limited
to employers that have a direct relationship with employees.198 In such
cases there are several theories concerning the liability of third party quasiemployers: Sibley Interference Theory, Spirt Delegation Theory, Joint
Employer Theory, Single Employer Theory, and Individual Supervisory
Liability Theory. This Article now turns to a discussion of each of these
legal doctrines.199

197. Indeed, the work environment of the future may not look anything like the work
environment today. In 2009, Time Magazine ran a special report on the future of work and
concluded that in the future, work will be more flexible, more freelance, more collaborative,
and far less secure. Alex Altman et al., The Way We’ll Work, TIME, May 25, 2009, at 39.
Moreover, the traditional notions of an office environment may become completely
obsolete. Thus, the workforce of the future often may not even involve showing up to a
physical workplace at all. As one article in Time’s Special Report explained:
More and more, though, the need to actually show up at an office that consists
of an anonymous hallway and a farm of cubicles or closed doors is just going to
fade away. It’s too expensive, and it’s too slow. I’d rather send you a file at the
end of my day (when you’re in a very different time zone) and have the
information returned to my desktop when I wake up tomorrow. We may never
meet, but we’re both doing essential work.
Seth Godin, The Last Days Of Cubicle Life, TIME, May 25, 2009, at 5. Indeed, the future
may already be upon us. In 2008, a San Francisco corporate law firm called Virtual Law
Partners opened. This firm has no physical office, has forty partners and all the attorneys
work remotely. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Virtually Practicing: Those Wanting Face
Time Need Not Apply, A.B.A. J., at 51 (June 2009) (discussing the dispersed nature of the
firm).
198. Assoc. of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 580 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (“A direct employment relationship is not a prerequisite to Title VII
liability”); Gore v. RBA Group, No. 03-CV-9442, 2008 WL 857530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2008); Laurin v. Pokoik, No. 02-CIV-1938, 2004 WL 513999, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15,
2004). Contra, Scaglione v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp.2d 311, 315 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “a direct employment relationship is a necessary trait of a Title
VII ‘employer’”).
199. Nevertheless, it is still recognized that the existence of an employer-employee
relationship is the primary element of a Title VII claim. Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460
F.3d 361, 370 (2d Cir. 2006); Pratt v. Hustedt Chevrolet, Index No. 05-4148 (DRH) (MLO),
2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 26312, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009). When liability is found under
a quasi-employer theory, there is still an employer relationship. It is simply not a direct
employment relationship and therefore not an employment relationship in the traditional
sense.
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Sibley Interference Theory

In 1973, the D.C. Circuit held that employers had a duty under Title
VII not to discriminate against employees whose employment opportunities
could be affected by an employer even if that employer did not directly
employ the individual in question.200 The plaintiff was a private duty nurse
who worked at the defendant hospital, but who was paid exclusively by the
patient and only worked with that patient.201 The plaintiff alleged sex
discrimination under Title VII after the hospital prevented him from
working with female patients.202
The hospital sought dismissal because there was no direct employment
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant hospital. In rejecting
the hospital’s argument, the court reasoned in part:
To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly
affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an
individual’s employment opportunities with another employer,
while it could not do so with respect to employment in its own
service, would be to condone continued use of the very criteria
for employment that Congress has prohibited.203
The court found it significant that Title VII provided that a charge of
discrimination could be filed with the EEOC by a “person aggrieved” as
opposed to the narrower class of “employees.”204 Equally significant to the
court was the fact that Title VII coverage is not limited to “employers” in
that labor unions and employment agencies are also subject to Title VII. 205
Therefore, the court held that Title VII coverage was appropriate because
of the plaintiff’s close nexus to the employer as well as the spirit and
language of the Act.206
As the Sibley court’s holding was largely based upon the interference
with employment opportunities, subsequent decisions involving similar
issues have been referred to by some courts as “interference” theory.”207
In Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California, the
Ninth Circuit endorsed the Sibley interference theory by holding that
California was subject to liability, even though the state did not directly
200. Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Sibley has been
described by a major employment law treatise as the leading case in this area of law.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 108.
201. Sibley, 488 F. 2d at 1341.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1342.
206. Id.
207. Gulino, 460 F.3d at 373 (2d Cir. 2006); Assoc. of Mexican-American Educators v.
California, 231 F.3d 572, 580 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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employ the plaintiffs, because it “interfered” with the employment
relationship between school teachers and the employing schools.208 That
case involved a claim, under Title VII, that challenged the validity of
California’s Basic Education Skills test, a perquisite for employment as a
teacher in California.209
Though several courts have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead in
Sibley,210 a conflict in the circuits developed after the First Circuit’s
decision in Lopez v. Massachusetts.211 In Lopez, the court rejected Sibley,
reasoning that the definition of an employer is limited to the common law
standard.212 As support, the First Circuit cited to several U.S. Supreme
Court cases which held that “when a statute contains the term ‘employee’
but does not define it, a court must presume that Congress has incorporated
traditional agency principles . . . .”213 The problem, of course, with the First
Circuit’s rationale is that when examining the Sibley Interference Theory
the court is examining employer status, not employee status.
The First Circuit, however, is not entirely alone. The Second Circuit,
has essentially rejected Sibley, but for different reasons than the First
Circuit in Lopez.214 The court reasoned that the term “employer” should
not be interpreted expansively and indicated that the straightforward
language of Title VII does not appear to support a Sibley like claim.215 This
led the court to state that while Congress imposed liability under Title VII
on additional parties who are not “employers” (such as labor unions),
“absent some evidence that Congress intended otherwise, we conclude that
all other parties with a similar ‘nexus’ to a plaintiff’s employment are
208. 231 F. 3d at 581.
209. Id. at 577.
210. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at § 2:3. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto.
Wholesaler’s Assoc. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 17–18 (1st Cir. 1994) (ADA case);
Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994) (Title VII case);
Christopher v. Stouder Mem’l Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 876–77 (6th Cir. 1991) (Title VII case);
Assoc. of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 580 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Title VII
case); Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (Title VII case);
Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F. 2d 291, 294 (11th Cir. 1988) (Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981 case).
211. 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Smiley v. Ohio, No. 1:10-CV-390, 2011 WL
4481350 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2011) (discussing conflict in the circuits).
212. 588 F.3d at 83.
213. Id. (citing Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448
(2003)); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989).
214. Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 374–76 (2d Cir. 2006); see also
Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., No. 06-1707-CV, 2008 WL 2609712, at *14 (2d
Cir. Jan. 16, 2008) (stating that it has no need to decide whether Gulino closed the door
entirely to the Sibley interference theory of liability).
215. Gulino, 460 F.3d at 374.
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excluded from the Title VII liability scheme.”216
The Supreme Court has never addressed the Sibley interference
theory.
C.

Spirt Delegation Theory

In Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association, the defendant
insurance company managed a pension fund to which employees were
required to contribute.217 That pension fund distributed higher pension
payments to males, based on actuarial tables that showed longer average
life expectancies for women than for men.218 The defendant insurance
company sought dismissal of the sex discrimination charge under Title VII
because they were not the employer of the employees in question.219
In holding that the insurance company could indeed face liability, the
Second Circuit broadly interpreted the term “employer” somewhat
similarly to Sibley. It stated that “the term ‘employer,’ as it is used in Title
VII, is sufficiently broad to encompass any party who significantly affects
access of any individual to employment opportunities . . . .”220 Moreover,
the court reasoned that “exempting plans not actually administered by an
employer would seriously impair the effectiveness of Title VII . . . .”221 The
Spirt Court wanted to avoid suggesting that “’an employer can avoid his
responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells.
Title VII applies to ‘any agent’ of a covered employer . . . .’”222
In Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, the Supreme Court held
that the corollary was also true. A traditional employer could be liable for
the acts of insurance companies that discriminate in how they offer benefits
to employees. The Norris Court’s reasoning was as follows:
Since employers are ultimately responsible for the
“compensation, terms, conditions, [and] privileges of
employment” provided to employees, an employer that adopts a
fringe-benefit scheme that discriminates among its employees on
216. Id. at 375. It should also be noted, however, that the D.C. Circuit itself did not
extend Sibley by refusing to impose liability on the Bureau of Engraving and Printing as a
“consumer” of tour guide services, holding that Congress never intended to impose civil
rights liability on consumer choice. See Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933, 941 (D.C. Cir.
2000); see also Smiley, No. 1:10-CV-390, 2011 WL 4481350, at n.6 (stating that Sibley is
limited to an “intermediary” between employees and organizations that employ them).
217. 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S.
1223 (1983).
218. Id. at 1058.
219. Id. at 1060.
220. Id. at 1063.
221. Id.
222. Id. (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718
n.33 (1978)).
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the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin violates Title VII
regardless of whether third parties are also involved in the
discrimination.223
The First Circuit followed Spirt in Carparts Distribution Center v.
Automotive Wholesaler’s Association of New England, Inc.224 Specifically,
the court invoked Spirt to hold that a trade association could be held legally
responsible as an employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act with
respect to benefits.225 The court reasoned, however, that liability would
only be found if the plan existed for the purpose of allowing the employer
to delegate its responsibility to provide health insurance benefits to its
employees.226
The Sixth Circuit, however, reached a seemingly opposite result from
Spirt and held that the same pension plan, TIAA-CREF, could not be held
liable for employment discrimination.227 It disapproved of the lower
court’s rationale for finding liability: that the close ties between the
university and TIAA-CREF were too great to allow each to deny
liability.228 The court also indicated that the university did not retain
TIAA-CREF as an agent or delegate any responsibility to it.229
Unfortunately, the court’s decision in this regard is brief and conclusory.
This decision was also vacated by the Supreme Court.230 Therefore, it is
difficult to draw any conclusions from it.
In 2008, the Second Circuit, in the same case which questioned
Sibley’s interference theory, narrowly limited Spirt to cases where the
direct employer delegated a core responsibility to a third party, such as an
entity providing pension benefits.231 Therefore, it held that the State of
New York, which required teachers to pass a test to receive a teacher’s
license, could not be held liable under Title VII merely because the State
imposed a regulation in the exercise of its concern over teacher
competence.232 It is unclear what situations today would fall into the
223. Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1089 (1983) ; see also Morgan v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted) (stating
that an employer can be vicariously liable for a discriminatory deferred compensation plan
administered by a third party, where the employer has some control over the program).
224. 37 F.3d 12, 17–18 (1st Cir. 1994).
225. Id.
226. The court held that relevant to this inquiry was whether the trade association had the
authority to determine benefit levels, whether alternate plans were available to employees,
and whether the traditional employer shared administrative responsibilities. Id.
227. Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983).
228. Id. at 238.
229. Id.
230. 463 U.S. 1223 (1983).
231. Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 376–77 (2006).
232. Id. at 378.
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category of delegation, other than a direct delegation of a pension or health
insurance plan.233
In 2009, however, the Second Circuit issued a significant decision
with respect to employer status without citing Spirt or any of the cases
concerning quasi-employer status. In Halpert v. Manhattan Apartments,
Inc., the court held that an employer could be held liable for the actions of
an independent contractor where the employer authorized the independent
contractor to make hiring decisions or where the independent contractor
had the apparent authority to make such decisions.234
Though Halpert does not expressly address Spirt or even employer
status, it implicitly supports that line of case law because it recognizes that
an entity can be held liable for discrimination where it delegated important
functions to a third-party independent contractor.235
Additionally, the Labor Board’s controversial decision in New York
Hotel and Casino236 appears to provide additional support for both the
Sibley interference theory and the Spirt delegation theory. Though the
Board did not cite to either decision, and this decision dealt with the issue
of unfair labor practices, the Board held that a property owner could violate
the Act by barring employees of a contractor from its premises.237
As is so often done in cases involving the definition of employers, the
Board focused on the definition of employee and held that the “Act clearly
regulates the relationship between an employer (such as NYNY) and
employees of other employers . . . .”238 While this decision is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent under the Act, which held that the definition
of an employee is not limited to situations where the disputants stand in a
proximate relation of employer and employee,239 it should be pointed out
233. Even before Gulino, one lower court questioned whether Spirt was good law, but
for different reasons. Seaglione v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The court’s questioning of Spirt was based upon later cases holding
that for an employee relationship to exist, there must be a hiring and the putative employees
must receive some form of remuneration. Id. However, that aspect of Seaglione is limited
to defining employee status, and does not appear relevant to employer status.
234. 580 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 2009).
235. Halpert followed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dunn v. Washington County
Hospital, 429 F. 3d 689, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2005), where the court held that an employer can
be held responsible for sexual harassment by an independent contractor-doctor who had
privileges at the hospital that employed the plaintiff. The court reasoned that employers
have a responsibility to provide nondiscriminatory working conditions. Unfortunately, the
court did not cite Spirt or any of the cases concerning quasi-employers. But see Houston v.
Manheim-New York, No. 09 Civ. 4544(SCR)(GAY), 2010 WL 744119, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 3, 2010) (stating that agency theory does not create liability for individuals under Title
VII).
236. 356 NLRB No. 119 (Mar. 25, 2011).
237. Id. at *14.
238. Id. at *5.
239. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 192 (1941) (noting the
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that the NLRB expressly relied upon a statute which states that liability is
not limited to employers who have a direct relationship with employees.240
While the utility of this decision, as well as the body of jurisprudence
it relies upon beyond NLRB case law, is unknown, it is included here
because it supports the notion that third-party employers who have no
direct employment relationship with the employees in question can be held
liable. Therefore, such employers fit within the definition of a quasiemployer as that term is used in this Article.
Finally, it should be noted that if Spirt and Sibley remain viable, it is
possible that an employer may face liability under both theories. A lower
court cited both Spirt and Sibley for the proposition that an employer can be
liable as a third party where it interferes with the employment relationship
and controls access to or the working environment of the plaintiff.241
D.

Joint Employer Theory

The concept of a joint employer cannot be discussed without also
discussing the related single employer doctrine, which this Article
discusses below.242 The terms are often used interchangeably and the line
between the two is often blurred.243 Under a joint employer analysis, each
employer has control over the employees, while under a single employer
theory, two separate entities are considered as one.244
This Article considers both joint and single employers to be within the
rubric of quasi-employers, because both of these concepts involve atypical
employment relationships where one entity may not directly employ the
individuals in question.
The issue of joint employer status has been subject to much
litigation245 and has long been recognized in traditional labor law.246 The
issue frequently arises in the context of closely related companies, such as a
congressional belief “’that disputes may arise regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee . . . .’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1147, at 9
(1935)).
240. 356 NLRB No. 119, 2011 WL 1113038, at *5 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)
(providing in part that the term employee “shall not be limited to employees of a particular
employer. . . .”)).
241. People v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 83-CV-564S, 1993 WL 30933, at *5–7 (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 1993).
242. See infra Section IV(E).
243. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2247.
244. Dias v. Cmty. Action Project, No. 07-CV-5163, 2009 WL 595601 (E.D. of N.Y.
Mar. 6, 2009), at *3–4; see also NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d
Cir. 1982) (distinguishing between single and joint employers).
245. See ALR, supra note 151.
246. See Becker, supra note 183, at 1540–44 (discussing NLRB joint employer
doctrine).
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parent and its subsidiary corporations, where both are alleged to be the
employer of a certain employee.247
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that under the FLSA, an
employee can have more than one employer, and indicated that it was
appropriate to look at whether related activities are involved, whether
unified operation exists, and whether the entities shared common control
and a common business purpose.248
A finding of joint employment status is significant because all joint
employers may be individually and jointly responsible for compliance with
employment statutes such as the FLSA and the NLRA.249 A determination
that two separate entities are in fact, joint employers, generally involves a
fact-intensive inquiry.250
Joint employer status has been defined a bit differently by some
courts. Indeed, one commentator, Professor Cynthia Estlund, has noted
that the issue of joint employer status under the FLSA “continues to puzzle
and divide the courts.”251
In a 2003 FLSA case, the Second Circuit exhaustively analyzed the
case law concerning joint employment and held that in determining
whether or not there is joint employment the following, non-exclusive
factors should be examined:
1. The equipment and premises of work;
2. Whether the corporations in question “had a business that
could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer
to another;”
3. The “extent to which the plaintiff performed a discrete line
job that was integral to” the “process of production” of the
putative joint employer;
4. Whether responsibility under contracts could pass from one
employer subcontractor to another without material change;
5. The degree of supervision by the putative joint employer;

247. See ALR, supra note 151, § 2[a].
248. Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 192–93, 195 (1973) (holding that building owner
and maintenance company were joint employers of maintenance workers, even though
contractual provision stated that these workers were employed by the building owner).
Today, regulations under the FLSA, 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2011), expressly recognize that
there can be a joint employment relationship. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d
61, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing joint employer status under the FLSA).
249. Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); LeSaint Logistics,
Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1997); Capital EMI Music, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 997 (1993).
250. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 76 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that “historical findings of fact . . .
underlie each of the relevant factors” coupled with “findings as to the existence and degree
of each factor”).
251. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 110 (2010).
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6. Whether the plaintiffs “worked exclusively or predominantly
for the” putative joint employer.252
The NLRB describes joint employer status as follows:
The joint employer concept recognizes that two or more business
entities are in fact separate but that they share or codetermine
those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment . . . . To establish joint employer status there must
be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters
relating to the employment relationship such as hiring, firing,
discipline, supervision and direction.253
In an appeal of an NLRB case, the Second Circuit explained that “an
essential element” of any joint employer determination is “sufficient
evidence of immediate control over the employees . . . .”254
Joint employer status has also been litigated under the FMLA,255 the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,256 as well as under a host of other employment
laws such as Title VII.257 Therefore, it is important for lawyers and
scholars to be aware of this theory.
1.

Professional Employer Organizations

A Professional Employer Organization (“PEO”) is a contractual
arrangement that purports to define the employer relationship. Typically,
the PEO assumes responsibility to administer and comply with employment
laws, while the original employer or client continues to run the business.258

252. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72 (2d Cir. 2003). But see Dias v. Cmty. Action Project, No.
07-CV-5163, 2009 WL 595601, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009) (examining several different
but related factors to determine joint employer status).
253. Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984). See also AT&T v.
NLRB, 67 F.3d 446, 451 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing joint employer status under the NLRA);
La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 1120 (2002), aff’d, 71 F. App’x 441 (5th Cir. 2003)
(agreeing with administrative law judge’s finding that respondent was not a joint employer);
LeSaint Logistics, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1997).
254. Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 435, 442
(2d Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting Clinton’s Ditch Cooperative Co. v. NLRB, 778
F.2d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)).
255. See, e.g., Almeida v. Athena Health Care Assocs., No. 3:07CV517 (PCD), 2009
WL 490066, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2009) (discussing joint employer status).
256. See, e.g., McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (2004) (holding that
Rehabilitation Act did not provide for private right of action).
257. See, e.g., Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 611 F. Supp.
344, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (clarifying statutory text by noting that “Title VII does not refer
to ‘employee’ but to ‘the person aggrieved,’” thus bringing plaintiff’s action “within the
ambit of Title VII . . . .”).
258. See What is a PEO?, NAPEO.ORG, http://www.napeo.org/peoindustry/
coemployers.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
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The employees are often said to be leased employees of the PEO.259 Thus,
the theory is that leased employees are employed by the PEO.260 The
National Association of Professional Employer Organizations, a national
trade group, considers such an arrangement to be “co-employment,” but it
does not describe the significance of co-employment.261
Because of this duality of responsibility, it is considered by this
commentator to be a type of a quasi-employer relationship.262
There has not been a significant amount of employment litigation
involving the status of PEO’s as employers.263 In LeSaint Logistics, Inc.,264
a PEO that provided payroll and human resources, handled workers
compensation paycheck deductions and inspections for a client employer
was found not to be a joint employer. Significantly, the PEO played no
role in the day-to-day operations of the business or with respect to the
259. See Stone, supra note 22, at 251 (discussing concept of employee leasing); Ariel D.
Weindling, Effective Management of a Contingent Workforce: A Brief Overview of Using
Contingent Workers, IBA LEGAL PRACTICE DIV. (Emp’t & Indus. Relations Law Comm.),
Apr. 2008, at 1 (discussing employee leasing firms and professional employer
organizations); see also Metro. Chi., Inc., NLRB Case No. 13-RC-20098 (Decision Nov. 12,
1999), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45800c8ff6 (utilizing
the term “leased employees” when discussing whether PEO was a joint employer); LeSaint
Logistics, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 1051, 1062 (1997) (concluding that respondent PEO held itself
out “as an employer or joint employer of the employees,” but was “an employer only in an
administrative sense.”).
The New York State Department of Labor, charged with administering the New
York Professional Employer Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 915–24 (McKinney 2002), placed
professional employer associations under the same category as employee leasing firms,
which indicates that the two classes of organizations are the same or similar. Professional
Employer Associations, N.Y.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.state.ny.us./
workerprotection/laborstandards/employer/peo.shtm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). While it is
recognized that the term used by the New York State Department of Labor is “Professional
Employer Association.” as opposed to a “Professional Employer Organization,” it appears
that these terms are one and the same.
260. Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical
and Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153,
158–60 (2003) (defining leased employees as employed by an employee leasing firm, but
who provide services for a separate firm).
261. See id.
262. Some firms chose to enter into a PEO relationship because it would enable them to
take advantage of economies of scale. Outsourcing employment law responsibility enables
small and medium-sized businesses with an expertise that they might not normal have. A
large PEO may also be able to obtain much more favorable insurance rates than a smaller
company. See Weindling, supra note 259.
263. Issues with regard to responsibility for unemployment insurance tax, Matter of
Robsonwoese, Inc., 840 N.Y.S. 2d 638, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding both PEO and
client employer are responsible for payment of Unemployment tax), as well as Workers
Compensation, Gray v. Johnson Employment Services, No. CA10-62, 2010 WL 4983129, at
*2 (Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2010) (holding that PEO can assert a Workers Compensation defense),
have arisen.
264. 324 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1997).
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development of the terms and conditions of employment.265
The Board reached this result by applying joint employer law and
concluded that the PEO and the client company did not share or
codetermine matters governing significant and essential terms and
conditions of employment.266
Indeed, the analysis utilized by the Labor Board is consistent with
case law addressing the joint employment status of employers (who are not
organized as a PEO) that provide payroll and other administrative services.
NLRB law is clear that simply outsourcing this function, without more,
does not establish a joint employment relationship.267
Though the case law is still developing in this area, based upon the
case law that has developed, the fact that a firm is organized as a PEO
appears to be largely irrelevant to joint employer status. Rather, the focus
is on substance of how the organization is run and controlled as opposed to
the form of the organization.
E.

Single Employer Theory

In labor relations, the single employer theory is often invoked by a
union in order to prevent an employer from using double-breasted
operations where it shifts work from a unionized plant to a non-union
facility.268 The non-union facility is essentially an “alter ego” of the
unionized facility and an employer would be able to evade the requirements
of its labor agreement if such practices were permitted.269
The single employer doctrine is invoked in a number of other
situations involving labor and employment law. Some common examples
include: when necessary to satisfy the amounts effecting interstate
commerce to establish NLRA jurisdiction,270 to assert coverage over work
under a collective bargaining agreement,271 to collect unpaid pension fund
contributions for work performed by employees at the non-union or alter

265. Id. at 1062.
266. Id. at 1061–62; see also Metro. Chi., Inc., 13-RC-20098 (Nov. 12, 1999) (same
notwithstanding the fact that the PEO had a representative at the worksite).
267. Rome Electrical Systems, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 38 (Nov. 24, 2010) (finding joint
employment relationship due to transfer of assets between entities in addition to payroll
services); La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 1120 (2002), enforced without op., 71
Fed. Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to find that company solely offering payroll
services was a joint employer).
268. S. Calif. Paint & Allied Trades v. Rodin & Co., 558 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.
2009).
269. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30 (2009) (discussing double breasted operations).
270. See, e.g., Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256–57 (1965).
271. See, e.g., CWA v. U.S. W. Direct, 847 F.2d 1475, 1477–78 (10th Cir. 1988).
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ego facility,272 to obtain information about the duty to bargain with the
union,273 or to impose a bargaining obligation on an entity where the
employees appear ostensibly to be employed by another employer.274
Some examples of single employers include a hospital and a
partnership of doctors that contracted with the hospital for office space,
secretarial services and where a corporation and its two wholly owned
subsidiaries operated adult movie theaters and book stores.275
In labor relations, to establish a single employer relationship, the
following factors are examined: 1) whether operations are interrelated; 2)
whether common management exists; 3) whether the parties have common
ownership or financial control; and, 4) whether centralized control of labor
relations exists.276 This is sometimes referred as the four-factor test.277
While the totality of the circumstances controls the Board’s
determination,278 all four factors are not necessarily equal. In labor cases,
the Board often gives more weight to centralized control of labor relations
factor.279 This factor has been described as being “critical” to a finding of
single employer status.280
Single employer status litigation is not limited to traditional labor law
litigation. Outside traditional labor law, such as under Title VII, the single
employer doctrine is invoked in the parent/subsidiary context281 as well as

272. See, e.g., Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489,
514–15 (5th Cir. 1982).
273. See, e.g., Dodger Theatricals Holding, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 953, 968–69 (2006).
274. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2242 (discussing single employer doctrine).
275. Id. at 2245–56 (citing authorities).
276. Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965). See also South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Operating
Eng’rs Local 627, 425 U.S. 800, 802 (1976) (quoting Radio & Television 4 factor test with
approval).
277. Paint America Services, Inc., 353 NLRB NO. 100, at *1 (Feb. 25, 2009) (using fourfactor test language); accord, Carnival Carting v. NLRB, Nos. 10-3408-ag (L), 10-3410-ag
(AXP), 2012 WL 10968 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2012).
278. Dow Chem. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 288, 288 (1988) (employing totality of the
circumstances analysis).
279. See, e.g., Mercy Hosp. of Buffalo, 336 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1284 (2001); accord,
Marvelli v. Chaps Cmty. Health Ctr., 193 F. Supp. 2d 636, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Dias v.
Cmty. Action Project, No. 07-CV-5163, 2009 WL 595601, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009)
(same under Title VII); Almeida v. Athena Health Care Assocs., No. 3:07CV517 (PCD),
2009 WL 490066, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2009).
280. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2244. However, control of labor relations is not in and
of itself determinative. Id. at 2244 n.172.
281. Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1241 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that single employer test is appropriate standard under Title VII in determining whether
parent companies may be considered employer of subsidiary’s employees); Dias, 2009 WL
595601 at *7; Morrow v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. 08 Civ. 6123 (DLC), 2009 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 39252, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2009) (same).
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in other situations.282 As in traditional labor law, the control of labor
relations factor is especially important.283
Interestingly, the Second Circuit under Title VII views the single and
joint employer tests as one test.284 In effect, however, the Second Circuit
was really only examining the single employer test because it was
describing the four single employer factors (1. interrelation of operations,
2. centralized control of labor relations, common management, and 4.
common ownership or control).285 The Second Circuit also held that this
test is not applicable to governmental employers because it may raise
constitutional issues that can alter the regulatory balance established by the
government.286
In any event, under a single employer theory, “all the employees of
the constituent entities are employees of the overarching integrated entity,
and all of those employees may be aggregated to determine whether it
employs fifteen employees,”287 which is a threshold determination under
Title VII. The policy that the law seeks to protect is one of fairness. It
allows for the imposition of liability when two nominally independent
entities do not have an arm’s length relationship with one another.288
F.

Individual Supervisory Liability Theory

Individuals are not normally considered “employers.” Obviously,
they do not have a direct employment relationship with employees. Since
they in fact may be considered an employer and held individually liable as
an employer, they are treated as a quasi-employer by this commentator.
The issue of liability of individuals as employers may seem
counterintuitive at first since individuals, in most cases, are not personally
liable for the actions of the corporation and the individuals who may face
liability as employers are employees themselves. Like so many areas of the
law, the answer to the legal question whether an individual can be held
liable as an employer is complex and the real answer is that “it depends.”
282. Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., No. 10-5323, 2011 WL 6016247
(6th Cir. Dec. 5, 2011).
283. Morrow, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39252, at *5. This factor includes such tasks as
administering job applications and personnel status reports. Id.
284. See, e.g., Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t., 460 F.3d 361, 378 (2d Cir. 2006).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 375, 378. Unfortunately, the court did not provide any analysis or examples
supporting this statement.
287. Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Marketing, LLC, 425 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 2005)
(emphasis in original) (Title VII case). See also Dias v. Cmty. Action Project, No. 07-CV5163, 2009 WL 595601, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009) (same); Cook v. Arrowsmith
Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
288. See, e.g., Dias, 2009 WL 595601, at *3; Paint America Services, Inc., 353 NLRB
No. 100, at *1 (Feb. 25, 2009).
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Depends upon what? It depends on the language and the intent of the
employment statute at issue.
Title VII provides that the term “employer” means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.289
In Miller v. Maxwell’s International, the Ninth Circuit held that a
supervisor could not be held responsible as an “agent” under Title VII
because the “obvious purpose” of the agent provision was to import the law
of respondent superior liability upon the employer.290
The court also found support from the fact that by limiting coverage to
employers who have fifteen or more employees, Congress desired to shield
small employers from the reach of the statute.291 Therefore, it was
inconceivable to the Ninth Circuit that this same Congress intended to
subject individuals to personal liability.292
The Second Circuit later recognized that although supervisory liability
could be found under a strict reading of the term “agent” in the statute, the
court refused to read Title VII in such a manner because that would be
contrary to the intent of Congress.293 The court then followed the analysis
utilized in Maxwell. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this
issue, all twelve circuits have concluded that there is no individual
supervisory liability under Title VII.294 Courts have come to the same
conclusion under the Americans with Disabilities295 Act296 and the Age
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2001(b) (2006).
290. 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993).
291. Id. at 587.
292. Id.
293. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313–14 (2d Cir. 1995).
294. See, e.g., Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2009); Tomka v.
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313–17 (2d Cir. 1995); Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542,
551–53 (3d Cir. 1996); Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180–82 (4th Cir. 1998);
Amolie v. Orleans Sch. Bd., 48 Fed. Appx. 917, 917 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Wathen v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405–06 (6th Cir. 1997); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp.,
137 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1998); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 379–
81 (8th Cir. 1995); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003);
Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1993); Haynes v. Williams,
88 F.3d 898, 900–01 (10th Cir. 1996); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir.
1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 33 (2d ed. 2011) (stating
that Miller has been widely followed).
295. Like Title VII, the ADA defines an employer as: “a person . . . who has 15 or more
employees . . . and any agent of such person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006).
296. See, e.g., Corr v. MTA Long Island Bus., No. 98-9417, 1999 WL 980960, at *2 (2d
Cir. Oct. 7, 1999), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d
161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002); Ford v. Frame, 3 Fed. Appx. 316, 318 (6th Cir. 2001); Sullivan v.
River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 808 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d
344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999);
Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999); Pritchard v. S. Co. Servs.,
102 F.3d 1118, 1119 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Discrimination297 in Employment Act.298
Yet, individuals have been found liable as employers under other
employment statutes such as the FMLA,299 FLSA,300 and state employment
law statutes301—at least where they had supervisory authority over the
plaintiff.
297. Like Title VII, the ADEA states that the term employer “also means (1) any agent
of such a person . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (2006).
298. See, e.g., Cerry v. Toussaint, 50 Fed. Appx. 476, 477 (2d Cir. 2002); Birbeck v.
Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994); Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238
F.3d 674, 686 (5th Cir. 2001); Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Educ., No. 96-4331, 1998 WL
57337, at *2 (6th Cir. 1998), aff’d,. 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998); Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ. of
Avoca Sch. Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 610, n.2 (7th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d
402, 404 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995); Miller, 991 F.2d at 597-88.
299. Under the FMLA, the definition of an employer includes any person who acts
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4). See Dewan v.
Universal Granite & Marble, Inc., No. 08-C-350, 2009 WL 590499 *6 (N. D. Ill. Mar. 6,
2009) (holding supervisor individually liable as employer under FMLA); Pedersen v.
Western Petroleum, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-997 TS, 2008 WL 977379 *7 (D. Utah Apr. 9, 2008)
(same); Wilson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 05 C 6408, 2006 WL 1749662 *2
(N.D. Ill. June 21, 2006) (discussing supervisory liability); Brewer v. Jefferson-Pilot
Standard Life Ins., 333 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (same); Richardson v. CVS
Corp., 207 F. Supp.2d 733, 741-42 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (same). see also Alcazar-Anselmo v.
City of Chi., No. 07 C 5246, 2008 WL 1805380 *2 (N.D. Ill. April 18, 2008) (discussing
supervisory liability under FMLA and FLSA; the court does not undertake any different
type of analysis because public employer is involved). But see, Haybarger v. Lawrence Co.
Adult Probation & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012) (same, but discussing that a conflict
in the circuits exists with respect to the issue of individual liability of supervisors under the
FMLA in the public sector).
The issue of individual liability under the FMLA has been “percolating” for over a
decade. Sandra Sperino, Under Construction: Questioning Whether Statutory Construction
Principles Justify Individual Liability Under The Family And Medical Leave Act, 71 MO. L.
REV. 71, 71 (2006) (extensively analyzing individual liability under FMLA); David R.
Mellon, Individual Liability As An “Employer” Under The Family And Medical Leave Act,
22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 449 (1998) (extensively discussing individual liability under FMLA
and comparing FMLA to other employment statutes).
300. See e.g., Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007); Herman v. RSR
Security Svcs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); U.S. Dep’t. of Labor v. Cole Enters.,
Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778-779 (6th Cir. 1995); Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th
Cir. 1987); Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F.
Supp. 326, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
301. Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W. 3d 659, 669 (Mo. 2009) (noting that under state
law, individuals can face liability as a person acting in the interest of the employer); Butler
v. Hartford Technical Inst., 704 A. 2d 222, 227 (Conn. 1997) (finding individual civil
liability under Connecticut state law because a criminal statute held employer officers and
agents responsible for unpaid wages); Chung v. New Silver Place Restaurant, Inc., 272 F.
Supp. 2d 314, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that under New York law an individual can be
liable as employer for unpaid wages if he or she has control over employment). By statute,
Illinois, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 115/13 (2008) and Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-323(b),
expressly permits officers and agents to be personally liable as employer’s for unpaid
wages.
By contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court held that there was no individual liability
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The FLSA, for example, defines employer as “any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.”302 In Boucher v. Shaw, the Ninth Circuit held that there cannot
be individual liability under the FLSA unless the person in question
exercises “control over the nature and structure of the employment
relationship, or economic control . . . .” 303 This standard was easily met as
two of the three individual defendants had a respective seventy and thirty
percent ownership interest and all three defendants had control and custody
over the plaintiff’s employment.304
Richardson v. CVS Corp. is an instructive, well-reasoned FMLA
case.305 The court refused to follow Title VII case law, which held that
individual supervisors could not be held liable because of the differing
statutory language. The court reasoned that the FMLA definition of an
employer, which is the same as under the FLSA (“any person who acts,
directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer”), is broader than the
word “agent” as used in Title VII.306
In determining whether there can be individual liability as an
employer, the court looked to the economic realities of the relationship and
considered factors such as whether the individual had an ownership
interest, whether the individual controlled day-to-day operations, and
whether the individual determined salaries.307 Notably, the individual
under Nevada law, which has a wage protection statute that defines employer as including
“every person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment or any
employee.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.011. Despite this seemingly broad definition, the
Nevada Supreme Court held that in the absence of clear legislative intent, it was not going
to presume that the state legislature intended to equate individual managers with employers.
Boucher v. Shaw, 196 P.3d 959, 963 (Nev. 2008); accord, Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d
323 (Colo. 2003) (corporate officers and agents not liable under Colorado wage and hour
law).
302. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006).
303. Boucher, 196 P.3d at 960 (Nev. 2008) (quoting Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997,
1012 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
304. Id. See also Gray v. Powers, No. 10-20808, 2012 WL 638497 (5th Cir. 2012)
(holding that a member of a limited liability corporation was not an employer under the
FLSA applying the economic realities test).
305. 207 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D. Tenn. 2001); see also Evans v. Henderson, No. 99 C
8332, 2000 WL 1161075 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2000) (employing a similar analysis in the
public sector context).
306. Richardson, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
307. Id. at 744. Significantly, the court held that these were not the only factors that
could be considered. In using the term “economic realities,” it is not entirely clear whether
the court was referring to the economic reality test, which is used to examine whether or not
an individual is an employee. See supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text; see also
Sperino, supra note 299, at 76 (2006) (stating that most courts have interpreted the FMLA
to permit individual liability if the person was acting on behalf of the private employer).
While this Article focuses on individual liability of supervisors employed by private
employers, it should be noted that there is a conflict in the circuits concerning this issue
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defendant who faced personal liability was not a director or officer, but
rather a district manager.308
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has reviewed how courts continue to struggle with the
definition of an employee under current employment law. Part of this
struggle may be due to the fact that there is tension amongst employers
who want to control their workers while simultaneously avoiding liability
under this nation’s labor and employment laws. Part of the confusion may
be inherent in the common law system or may be caused by poorly worded
statutes. Whatever the cause, categorizing an employee is clearly
problematic, and therefore it should come as no surprise that courts are also
struggling with the definition of an employer.
Determining employer status often involves difficult issues because
there is a large variety of employers, and because the nature of work is
continuously changing. This Article explored the employer status of quasiemployers, who, to borrow a phrase from the Supreme Court, are in the
borderland between employers and non-employers.309
The notion that quasi-employers may be subject to our nation’s labor
and employment laws is not a unique proposition. In other contexts, third
parties are subject to labor and employment regulation even though they do
not directly employ the individuals in question. This Article has discussed
several examples of this including the regulation of secondary boycotts and
the controlling employer policy under OSHA.310
As this Article demonstrates, simply because one is not labeled an
employer, does not mean that he or she is not in fact an employer. The
same is true, of course, with respect to an employee. This Article has
documented at least five situations where quasi-employer liability can be
found.
They are the Sibley Interference theory where employer
responsibility is found because the employer interferes with the
employment of an employee; the related Spirt delegation theory where a
third party is held responsible as an employer because it has been delegated
under the FMLA with respect to whether public officials employed by a public employer
can be held individually liable as employers. Rutland v. Pepper, 404 F.3d 921, 923 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2005). This is because the term “public agency” is separately defined. See Haybarger,
supra note 299 (analyzing this issue); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 827 (6th Cir.
2003) (discussing this issue); Sperino, supra note 299, at n.26 (noting conflicting case law
with respect to the imposition of personal liability in the public sector). Compare 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(4)(A), with 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(B).
308. Richardson, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 744. But see Sperino, supra note 299, at 71–72
(criticizing courts for only undertaking a cursory analysis of this issue).
309. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’s., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944).
310. See supra notes 186–192 and accompanying text.
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an important responsibility that effects the terms and conditions of
employees; the joint employer theory where two separate businesses can
both be considered the employer; and the related single employer theory
where two nominally separate businesses can be considered a single
employer. Finally, under certain statutes, supervisors can be personally
liable and therefore, they are considered to be a quasi-type of employer.
Quasi-employers are as fully responsible as traditional employers.
Therefore, it is important for the law to have a clear definition of who an
employer is so both employees and employers know what their rights and
responsibilities are. The consequences of not being able to identify the
proper employer can, of course, be fatal to any litigation.311
In labor and employment law today, the question of who an employer
is remains of paramount concern because liability is almost wholly
dependent upon employer status.312 No matter what one’s views are with
respect to the controversial case law and issues cited herein, uniformity in
the law is necessary. The time is ripe for an authoritative distinction
among the definitions of employee, quasi-employer, and employer.
Future work environments will almost certainly look very different
from those of today. Outlining clear criteria to define employment status is
necessary in order to provide future generations with guidelines with which
to analyze those environments.313 It is hoped that this Article will help
311. In Dejoie v. Medley, Jr., 9 So.2d 826 (La. 2009), for example, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana dismissed an employment discrimination case brought under state law against the
state because the state was not the plaintiff’s employer. See also Okoi v. El Al Israel
Airlines, Index No. 05-5370 (DRH)(WDW), 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9610 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10,
2009) (dismissing a Title VII claim against an airline because it was not the plaintiff’s
employer); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability For Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J.
EMPL. & LAB. L. 1, 13 (2010) (stating that only employers are liable for improper working
condition violations).
With respect to the issue of employee status (as opposed to employer status), if an
individual is not an employee they generally do not receive any statutory protection. See,
e.g., Feldmann v N.Y. Life Ins. Co, No. 4:09CV2129MLM, 2011 WL 382201 (E.D. Mo,
Feb. 3, 2011) (holding that an independent contractor is not protected under Title VII); Kern
v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that Title VII is an employment
statute applicable only to employees and prospective employees); Murphy v. ERA Realty,
674 N.Y.S. 2d 415, 416 (holding similarly under state human rights law). But see Richard
Bales & Lindsay Mongenas, Defining Independent Contractor Protection Under the
Rehabilitation Act, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 435 (2011) (discussing conflict in the circuits over
the issue of whether independent contractors are protected against discrimination on the
basis of disability under the Rehabilitation Act). See generally Lofaso, supra note 62, at
499 (2010).
312. Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J.
EMPL. & LAB. L. 1, 12–15 (2010) (criticizing the limitation of liability under the FLSA
which is limited to employers and arguing for broader responsibility for third parties who
effectively control the supply of commerce).
313. See Altman, supra note 197 (discussing the potential work force of the future).
More than a decade ago, the late Professor Clyde Summers indicated that approximately 25–
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bring clarity to the area of uncertainty in the borderland between employers
and non-employers and between employees and non-employees.

30% of the work force is engaged in a form of peripheral employment other than traditional
full-time work. Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP.
LAB. L. J. 503, 519–20 (1997).

